

WORLD DRUG TRAFFIC AND ITS IMPACT ON U.S. SECURITY

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY
ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-SECOND CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

PART 4
THE GLOBAL CONTEXT;
REPORT OF GENERAL WALT

SEPTEMBER 14, 1972

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(II)

C O N T E N T S

Statement of:

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(III)

WORLD DRUG TRAFFIC AND ITS IMPACT ON U.S. SECURITY

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 1972

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT
AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 3:15 p.m., in room 3302, New Senate Office Building, Senator James O. Eastland (chairman), presiding.

Present: Senators Eastland and Thurmond.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, chief counsel.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Dickey?

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM L. DICKEY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY (ENFORCEMENT, TARIFF AND TRADE AFFAIRS, AND OPERATIONS), U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, AND HAROLD W. WRIGHT, TREASURY SPECIAL AGENT, NARCOTICS DESK OFFICER, CUSTOMS AGENCY SERVICE, BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. DICKEY. Mr. Chairman, my name is William L. Dickey, and I am the Deputy Assistant Secretary for the U.S. Treasury Department, Enforcement, Tariff and Trade Affairs, and Operations.

My purpose here today is to introduce the Treasury agent, Customs agent, Mr. Harold W. Wright, who is a member of our Customs Agency Service, our Federal Investigating Staff here, to discuss Customs' role in the *Squella-Avendano* case.

And I might say that Mr. Wright, in 1970, at the time that case broke, was with the Customs Agency Service assigned—

The CHAIRMAN. Speak a little louder, please, sir.

Mr. DICKEY. At the time the *Squella* case broke, he was with the Customs Agency Service assigned to Miami. Currently, he is a senior special agent in Washington, D.C., the narcotics desk officer in charge of working with the various district offices for the eastern part of the United States on narcotics. Mr. Wright is generally familiar with the facts of the case. He has researched the files; he is fully knowledgeable of Customs' participation in this particular case and qualified to speak on it.

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I might add, however, that Customs participation in the *Squella* case was quite minimal, more so than several other cases, wherein the Customs and the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs co-operated in the investigation. And I would like to have Mr. Wright discuss briefly the facts of the case and indicate briefly what Customs' role was. And that is our brief purpose here today.

Mr. SOURWINE. Thank you, sir. We would like to have it for the record. And as the Assistant Secretary knows the committee had a precis of a number of these important cases put in its record yesterday. This one case was not covered, and we want it as part of the background.

Would you just tell us briefly what the case was, and Customs' participation in it?

Mr. WRIGHT. Yes, sir. Mr. Chairman, gentlemen, Oscar Squella-Avendano is an individual, a defendant, and he was convicted by the Bureau of Narcotics in 1970. This case originated when information was received that a large quantity of cocaine would be transferred between Miami and New York. The Bureau of Narcotics in Miami was able to introduce an undercover agent into some members of this group. As a result, on the 27th of July, 82 kilos of cocaine was seized in Coral Gables, Fla. Five persons were arrested at that time when they were caught in the act of transferring cocaine in cellophane-type packages from boxes and into suitcases.

Subsequent to this raid, Oscar Squella-Avendano was arrested and an associate who worked with him as a mechanic. The participation of Customs was the identification of Squella. They did not know who he was at this time. We knew who he was. One of our agents received information from a source where he might be. This was given to the Bureau of Narcotics and that night they went to this apartment and they found Squella, and they placed him under arrest.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was a Chilean?

Mr. WRIGHT. He is a Chilean; correct, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. And he flew a private airplane?

Mr. WRIGHT. Yes, he did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he bring narcotics to the United States in his airplane?

Mr. WRIGHT. Yes, sir. This was in this case where he allegedly brought in the 82 kilos in the aircraft.

Mr. SOURWINE. And he was under surveillance from the time he landed until he was arrested, was he?

Mr. WRIGHT. This is my understanding, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. And he was arrested. Was the cocaine found in his possession?

Mr. WRIGHT. No, sir. He was arrested. He was seen near this aircraft.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. WRIGHT. And he was not identified. We knew who owned the aircraft and, from the description, we were able to determine it was Squella. And this information was given to the Bureau of Narcotics.

Mr. SOURWINE. This is what tied the case up?

Mr. WRIGHT. Well, I would say this was a part of the case, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was tried and convicted?

Mr. WRIGHT. Five people were tried including Squella and he received, he was convicted of five counts, 15 years on the first and 10 on the others, and they were to run concurrently.

Mr. SOURWINE. He is now in jail?

Mr. WRIGHT. He is in jail. Four other individuals were also convicted and two are listed as fugitives.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman.

Senator THURMOND. No question, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. DICKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOURWINE. General Walt?

STATEMENT OF GEN. LEWIS W. WALT, U.S. MARINE CORPS (RETIRED), DIRECTOR, U.S. SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY TASK FORCE INVESTIGATION ON WORLD DRUG SITUATION

General WALT. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Senator Thurmond.

Mr. Chairman, I have about an hour and 20 minutes of testimony here which I had planned to give. Now, at your pleasure, sir, I can give it all, I can cut it down, I can read my introduction.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we do not have—we are going to have two more rollcall votes that I know of before that time.

General WALT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I would suggest that you summarize your statement, and put the rest in the record.

General WALT. All right, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. May the order be, Mr. Chairman, that if the hearing is interrupted the statement as offered by the general will go in the record as though read?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

STATEMENT OF GENERAL WALT

General WALT. Mr. Chairman, in my previous testimony I dealt with the drug situation in Southeast Asia. In my testimony today I propose to view our national drug problem within a global context—because the problem is in fact of global dimensions, and the war against it has to be fought on a global battlefield.

The statistics which you have just put into the record, Mr. Chairman, help to establish the magnitude of the problem. I shall not repeat these statistics, but I would like to offer a number of additional observations to help define and illuminate the problem.

First, drug addiction imposes an intolerable burden on society—through wasted human potential, through increased crime, and through the staggering economic costs of combating the traffic and providing hospitalization and institutionalization and welfare for its victims.

Second, drug addiction has all of the attributes of a contagious disease because addicts are under an irresistible compulsion to addict others. Indeed, it is just about as contagious and just about as deadly as the bubonic plague.

I show you here a diagram which will illustrate how this contagion spreads. You have that diagram in front of you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir. I have it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, may this be printed in the record?

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

(The diagram referred to follows.)




FIG. 1.—The spread of heroin abuse among fifty-eight young people living in Crawley in 1967.

General WALT. The diagram, drawn by a British psychiatrist, René de Alarcón, shows how two addicts in the small British town of Crawley spread the sickness of heroin addiction to 56 other people over a period of 5 years. To be precise, Dr. de Alarcón was able to establish that the two initial addicts were directly responsible for initiating another 46 young people into heroin addiction. The origins of the other 10 cases of addiction were not clearly traceable, but there is solid reason for believing that the existence of an addict community in Crawley played some role. It is common knowledge that no one can even begin to inject drugs into their veins unless they are taught the technique by an established addict.

Now, multiply the infectious circles in this diagram by roughly 10,000 and you will have some conception of the problem we are up against in America today.

My third observation has to do with the extraordinary complexity of stopping the traffic.

The devices and stratagems employed by the narcotics smugglers are as limitless as the opportunities open to them.

The two tons of opium which was seized in Thailand just before my arrival was carried in tank trucks.

In Asia and the Middle East, camels have been known to carry opium in metal cylinders in their stomachs.

Motorists and truckdrivers smuggle in narcotics in the hollow of their drive shafts, behind their headlights, and in special compartments built into their gasoline tanks, or concealed elsewhere in the bodies of their cars or trucks.

Air travelers will use false bottom suitcases. Women travelers frequently pass customs by concealing narcotics in their brassiers and in their body cavities.

Hashish and other narcotics are shipped through the mails in a thousand disguises. In one case the narcotics were moulded into rosary beads. In another case hashish was pressed and painted so that it represented the lacquer plates so popular with tourists in the Far East. Teddy bears have been unstuffed and restuffed with heroin. And so on ad infinitum.

Clearly it is impossible for the most diligent customs agents to body-search the hundreds of millions of travelers who annually cross international frontiers. Nor can they tear apart every automobile or truck or rip open every teddy bear, or break off a chunk of every lacquer plate that is sent through parcel post.

Substantial seizures can only be made under very limited conditions. They can be effected if intelligence is developed which makes it possible to close in before the shipment embarks for the United States, or, which, alternatively, enables our customs to pinpoint the passengers or automobiles or trucks or planes to be searched. Sometimes effective seizures can also be made with sophisticated detection technologies.

The fourth matter I wish to note at the outset is the magnitude of our current antinarcotics effort. Since President Nixon called for an all-out war on drugs in his message to Congress of June 17, 1971, we have moved in many different ways and on a broad front.

A formidable array of new agencies and committees and offices have been set up, each designed to play a specific role in the national war on drugs. Indeed, there has probably never been a national effort in any social area comparable in magnitude and urgency to the many-sided effort that is now being made to stem the drug epidemic in our country.

My fifth observation is that, despite the vast sums of money we are spending, we are still not winning the war. We are making far more seizures and far more arrests—and so are our friends in Europe and Asia. But the sad fact is that heroin, hashish and cocaine continue to pour into the United States. Even the most optimistic narcotic agents concede that 80-85 percent, and possibly more, of the total volume of drugs targeted for our country, succeed in evading our various law enforcement agencies.

Our heroin addict population today is almost 10 times as large as it was in 1960, and almost twice as large as it was 2 or 3 years ago.

Our educational efforts—including motion pictures, TV programs, and hundreds of millions of printed tracts—has unquestionably had some impact, but it has failed to stem the trend.

As for our various rehabilitation efforts, it is questionable whether our national batting average to date exceeds the 15 percent mark.

All of this points to the conclusion that if we fail to deal with this problem effectively over the measurable future—let us say over the next 5 years, or 10 years at the outside—our society may be doomed.

The estimated 600,000 addicts in our country today are reportedly responsible for from 50 to 60 percent of our street crimes and petty burglary—for the simple reason that each addict requires \$50-\$75 a day to support his habit. More than any other single factor it is the

rise in addiction that has converted our streets into dangerous jungles and our cities into places of fear.

What America will be like 3 years hence if the number of addicts again doubles is something that almost defies imagination.

A second conclusion, which flows from the first one, is that, somehow, we must find a way to deal with the problem. To do so we are going to have to devise—without delay—a combination of measures, domestic and international, far more ambitious, far more rigorous, and perhaps far more costly than anything we have yet attempted or even contemplated.

Perhaps the most important discovery we made in the course of our round-the-world investigation is that drug problems can be prevented and drug epidemics can be rolled back. But if we are to learn from the experiences of other countries, we are going to have to reassess much of our social and legal philosophy.

I have heard it said that ours is a drug-prone society, that our drug epidemic is merely a symptom of the social wrongs which afflict our society, that we will never succeed in bringing the drug problem under control until we find effective answers to the problems of the ghettos and of the underprivileged and the alienated—and, of course, until we end the Vietnam war. The primary blame for drug addiction among our youth today is often placed on our society instead of being placed on the individual where it belongs. It used to be that an addict was looked down on as a derelict in our society, but today, in some quarters, the drug addict is almost placed on a pedestal as a victim of our society.

A confidential report to the White House submitted last year by an ad hoc interagency committee, put the matter this way:

* * * Drug abuse cannot be eliminated or significantly reduced by merely reducing the supply of available drugs. Therefore efforts must be made to alter those factors which increase the demand for drugs as a way of coping with life.

I would be the first to agree that there are still serious inequities in our society which we must seek to right. Beyond this, our society is suffering from a widespread breakdown of family and social discipline, of morals, and of patriotic traditions. While the great majority of the American people are still solid and wholesome, a distressingly large percentage of our young people are alienated and drug-prone. To all of these problems we must try to find answers. Massive social therapy will be necessary to overcome these infections and restore the health of our society. But even if we move on an heroic scale, we are talking about programs that will take 5 years, 10 years, or longer to implement. We cannot wait that long to deal with the drug epidemic. If we do wait that long, we may find ourselves confronted with an impossible salvage operation.

I do not agree with the defeatist assumption that we cannot eliminate or significantly reduce drug abuse by reducing the availability of drugs. In fact, everything we learned on this trip points in the opposite direction—it points to the conclusion that the availability of drugs is a decisive factor, that availability can be controlled, and that, where it is controlled, the rate of addiction is automatically limited.

The GI's in Korea are basically the same GI's we have in Vietnam. They come from the same broad cross section of society and they have, by and large, the same strong points and the same complex of weak-

nesses. In Vietnam, our forces were caught up in a massive heroin epidemic when, overnight, high grade heroin became available everywhere at \$1 a vial. The saturation attack succeeded for the simple reason that no one had foreseen it and neither the South Vietnamese Government nor our own Armed Forces had erected any defenses that might have dammed the influx as it got started. In South Korea, by way of contrast, heroin has not been readily available because the South Korean Government has for many years now stringently enforced its antinarcotic laws. The result is that heroin addiction has been kept at a very low level among our Armed Forces in Korea.

The case of Japan is particularly relevant to our own experience. Family and social discipline are probably stronger in Japan than in any other highly industrialized society. And yet even this strong inner discipline did not protect the Japanese people from the ravages of a heroin epidemic which swept over their country in the late fifties and early sixties when the absence of stringent laws made drugs widely available.

In 1962, the Japanese Government decided to crack down hard. The epidemic was rolled back and brought under effective control—because the availability of drugs was dramatically reduced.

The Government of the People's Republic of China and other totalitarian governments have no problem in controlling addiction because of the draconian manner in which they enforce their laws. Addiction is also effectively controlled in countries like Taiwan and South Korea which have strong governments—authoritarian, but infinitely less restrictive than the Peking Government. Most important of all from our own standpoint is the Japanese example—because the Japanese have shown that it is possible to roll back a far-advanced epidemic within the framework of a highly democratic society. This they succeeded in doing by tough laws, rigorous enforcement, and heavy penalties. Their success is all the more striking because their high standard of living would, under ordinary circumstances, make their country a prime target for the international drug traffickers.

The limitation of availability is, as I have indicated, of vital importance. If, through rehabilitation and education, we can simultaneously reduce the demand, then we will be squeezing the traffickers from two sides. Reduced availability and reduced demand can help to mutually reinforce each other. On the one hand, reduced availability will encourage more addicts to seek treatment, which will, in turn, reduce the demand. On the other hand, any significant reduction in demand may serve to eliminate some of the weaker traffickers from the picture—bringing about a further reduction in availability.

I have heard some optimistic reports on the progress scored in the rehabilitation field over the past year, which encourages me to believe that such an outlook may not be unrealistic.

THE QUESTION OF CANNABIS

Our investigation focused primarily on heroin because the heroin epidemic is by far the most serious component of our national drug problem. Time and time again, however, the realization was forced on us that the problem of heroin cannot be considered in isolation from the

problem posed by the spreading use of other drugs—of cocaine, of hashish, of LSD, yes, and of marihuana too.

We are dealing here with an interlocking culture, Mr. Chairman—with a “kick” culture—where individuals will sometimes indulge in several drugs simultaneously, and where the use of a milder drug will—not always, but frequently—prepare the way for addiction to stronger drugs.

The report of the National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse—the so-called Shafer Commission—while it called for discouraging the use of marihuana, in effect recommended the legalization of cannabis for personal use and for the distribution of small quantities.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your personal opinion about the Shafer Commission report?

General WALT. Well, sir, I feel that marihuana is a dangerous drug, and it leads the young people into more dangerous drugs, and that is particularly so now that we are getting large quantities of hashish in this country. Hashish is nothing but concentrated marihuana. It comes from the same plant. Marihuana is the leaf and the female flower of that plant, and hashish is the resin from the plant. The hashish is at least five times as strong as marihuana and they are developing a new process now where they claim that they can distill this hashish and get a liquid hashish that is 30 to 40 times as strong as marihuana. This they put into cigarettes. So, I think marihuana is a very dangerous thing. Marihuana has this quality sir. The T.H.C., the active chemical factor of marihuana and hashish, gets into the body, and it clings to the fatty tissues of the body, particularly the brain tissues, and after a considerable period of time it cannot help but affect the health of the individual, including his mental health.

Now, back in Egypt, as far as 400 years ago, sir, they tried to ban marihuana because they said it put more people in the insane asylum than any other cause in their country.

Senator THURMOND. Where was that?

General WALT. Egypt, sir. And you have a witness coming here Monday, Mr. Chairman, who is a real professional in this business. He is the Director of the United Nations Laboratory in Switzerland. He has been the head of that laboratory now for 16 years. And for the last 6 years they have been concentrating on marihuana and hashish. And he said they have not scratched the surface yet, but from the research they have done, he is certain that the marihuana is dangerous, that the cannabis plant is, in any form, dangerous to the human body.

My staff assistants and I approached our investigation with a more or less open mind as far as the Shafer report was concerned. As a result of what we learned in the course of our investigation, and as a result of some further study of the report, we are now of the opinion that several of the Commission's basic assumptions were in error and that these erroneous assumptions led them to overlook important sources of information which might have pointed to somewhat different conclusions.

Among the many officials of foreign governments with whom we discussed the Shafer report we did not find a single one who shared the tolerant attitude of the Shafer Commission toward the legalization of cannabis. In Japan, France, and other countries, we were told that the Shafer Commission report had caused consternation in the

ranks of those concerned with the problem of drug control, and that it seriously undercut their efforts to combat the growing use of marihuana in their own countries.

In Tokyo the chief of police told our delegation that, shortly after the Shafer report appeared, Japanese marihuana fans distributed tens of thousands of fliers synopsisizing the major findings of the Commission. This created serious difficulties for the Japanese Government's antidrug efforts.

In several countries, embassy personnel with whom we discussed the Shafer report told us that when the Shafer Commission team visited their embassies, they had the distinct impression that their minds were already made up and that they were looking for confirmation of their viewpoint rather than for balanced information.

We were particularly surprised to learn that the Shafer Commission team, in the course of its foreign peregrinations, did not take the time to check in with Dr. Olav Braenden, the Director of the U.N. Narcotics Laboratory in Geneva. Dr. Braenden has been the head of the Laboratory since it was established 16 years ago. For the past 6 years, under instructions from the U.N.'s Division of Narcotics Drugs, he has placed priority emphasis on cannabis research. His office has also functioned as a clearinghouse for some 30 other collaborating laboratories in other countries. All of which, it seems to me, should have made Dr. Braenden a uniquely qualified source of information.

Dr. Braenden's evaluation of cannabis is markedly different from that of the Shafer Commission. He told our task force that we know very little about the effects of marihuana, but that the more we learn the more dangerous it appears to be. He said that there was evidence that, with repeated use, cannabis, like DDT, tends to build up in the tissues of the body; that there is also some evidence of permanent brain damage; and that rat experiments with cannabis have resulted in a very high percentage of birth abnormalities.

Some people have likened the effects of marihuana to smoking or to social drinking. Smoking is smoking, and social drinking is social drinking. Neither, normally, leads to other forms of experimentation, and nonsmokers and nondrinkers at parties are not constantly subjected to peer pressures to engage in the acts of smoking and drinking. But the "experimenters" who go to pot parties are, more frequently than not, disposed to experiment with other types of drug "kicks" that may be available in their groups.

Moreover, those who are using drugs are almost invariably afflicted with a missionary zeal to get other people into the act with them. This is so with pot smokers; it is even more so with hashish dependents—and it becomes obsessional by the time drug abusers graduate to heroin. Because of this, there is general agreement among the experts that heroin addiction must be treated as a contagious disease. And pot smoking is frequently the first way-station to the contraction of this contagion.

The Shafer report concedes the point that hashish—which is simply a more concentrated form of cannabis—can be terribly destructive physically and psychologically. It ignores the fact, however, that hashish and heroin are becoming increasingly more available at pot parties: seizures of hashish entering the United States increased almost twenty-fold from fiscal 1969 to 1972. And it offers no formula to assure that

pot experimenters will refrain from experimenting with these more dangerous drugs if any are pushed upon them by proselytizing peers.

Nor does the report say how cannabis in the form of "grass" is to be legally distinguished from cannabis in the form of hashish; nor does it discuss the feasibility of making cannabis in the form of "grass" permissible under the law—as it recommends—while retaining a firm legal ban on cannabis in the form of hashish—which it appears to favor.

The Shafer report incorporated much valuable research and thinking, and with certain of its recommendations I find myself in complete agreement. For example, I agree with the report that it does not make sense to sentence youthful marihuana smokers to several years in prison—although I would personally favor retaining a fine for marihuana smokers, by way of underscoring the point that marihuana smoking does damage to society. But whether one agrees or disagrees with the basic findings of the Shafer Commission, I think there can be no disagreement on the point that the report cannot be accepted as gospel for all time—that we still have a lot to study and a lot to learn. Because of this, I am happy that the subcommittee has decided to invite the testimony of Dr. Olav Braenden, the distinguished Director of the United Nations Narcotics Laboratory in Geneva.

Mr. Chairman, I thought it might be useful to start out with this overview of certain essential aspects of the drug problem. It serves to establish a framework for my further remarks. I now propose to deal with the problem under the following captions:

- (1) Heroin: The Turkish-French connection.
- (2) Heroin: The Southeast Asia-Hong Kong connection.
- (3) Heroin and hashish: The Afghanistan-Pakistan connection.
- (4) Cocaine: The Latin American connection.
- (5) The question of Communist involvement.
- (6) Some recommendations for improving the machinery of national and international control.

HEROIN: THE TURKISH-FRENCH CONNECTION

There are two major routes by which heroin enters the United States—each with several trunk routes. The first route I shall call the "Turkish-French connection"; the second route, the "Far Eastern connection," or the "Southeast Asia-Hong Kong connection."

The "Turkish-French connection" involves opium grown in Turkey and processed into morphine base either in Turkey or in Lebanon. It is then moved to the Marseilles area, where it is converted into heroin before it is shipped to the United States. Most of the morphine base travels overland to France, via Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Austria, and Germany. A good deal of it, however, travels by sea, and makes its way into France via Greece, Italy, or Lebanon.

From Marseilles, the heroin travels to the United States via a number of routes, direct and indirect. A good deal of it comes directly to the New York heroin market, either body-carried or concealed in double bottomed trunks or tucked away in specially built compartments on vehicles. Some of it is brought to Canada first and then taken across the border at several preferred crossing points. Much more of it is now entering the United States via Mexico and other Latin Ameri-

can countries, whose interception capabilities are not quite on a par with those of Canada.

According to rough estimates, about 35-40 percent of the heroin entering the United States comes from Europe, either directly or via Canada; another 30-35 percent comes via South America, and Panama; while some 20 percent enters the United States via Mexico. The latter figure also includes some heroin refined from native opium.

I. TURKEY

Turkey is generally credited with being the ultimate source of some 70 to 80 percent of the heroin entering the United States. The opium is processed into morphine base bricks by Turkish traffickers for shipment to Marseilles (this reduces its volume by 90 percent). In the labs of Marseilles it is further processed to convert it into heroin, for shipment primarily to the United States.

The Turkish Government has until this year permitted the licit production of opium. Theoretically, all the opium produced was supposed to be grown under license, and all of it was supposed to be sold to the government monopoly. But because the black market offered roughly double the legal price, a substantial percentage of the opium found its way into the hands of the traffickers.

The Turkish Government, after progressively restricting the number of counties in which opium could be grown, will this year be terminating all licit opium production. The Turkish peasants, like the Meo tribesmen, have grown opium for centuries without themselves employing it as a narcotic. They have used its poppy seeds for baking and for oil, the hulls of the seeds for cattle feed, and the straw for weaving or for fuel. They, too, see no reason why they should be asked to discontinue producing their main cash crop.

The decision of the Turkish Government to terminate licit production, while courageous, has run into a lot of opposition—from the peasants involved, and from both conservative and pro-leftist newspapers. In attacking the Government for its decision, the pro-leftist press in Turkey was striking simultaneously at its two main enemies: American "imperialism" for pressuring the government into forbidding opium production, and the Turkish military regime for submitting to the American "imperialists."

It is difficult for Americans to realize at a distance just how plausible the arguments in favor of opium cultivation can sound to Turkish peasants. I want to quote a few paragraphs from a series of articles which appeared last December in the Turkish newspaper Aksam, a militant leftist publication, so that the Senators will have a better understanding of the difficulties the Turkish Government has to overcome. I quote:

You, the chatterbox politician, know that your duty is not to say yes to everything, and take up the problems of the children of opium. Oh! I have almost forgotten. If no solution is found to the problem of poppy oil, the Deputies from Afyon, Usak, Kutahya, Isparta, Burdur will never be reelected in their village anymore * * *

We have prepared this report by going from one village to the other. We have listened to women in the villages of Usak * * * The village women circle us. Each one of the women saying a different thing, each voice expressing a different trouble * * *

What are we going to feed our children? How shall we make our pastry? Our animals will also starve, my son. We do not want the gum of opium poppy. It can remain in the field. But we cannot do without poppy oil. A can of olive oil is 300 liras, my son. How can the villager find that money? Only city men and women can eat olive oil and butter. We can make sweets, salads, and bread with it. What can we do without poppy?

We were deeply engrossed in conversation about poppy oil with the village headman, Ali Koskin, in one sector of the coffeehouse, when we heard a loud voice coming from where the stove was burning: "They have signed our verdict of death shamelessly, for the sake of the infidel."

The word "infidel," I should point out, is still used by the Turkish peasants to mean "foreigner." In this case, it means "American."

The problem of the opposition remains serious, despite the fact that—thanks to some \$35 million in special American assistance—the opium farmers have been promised compensation and assistance during the crop substitution phase. U.N. experts believe that this opposition will fade away when the farmers find that they can earn more with miracle wheat and other crops than they did with opium. But meanwhile the parliamentary opposition has introduced two bills calling for the repeal of the ban on poppy cultivation, and over 100 of the 450 Deputies have already announced their support for these bills.

Even if the Turkish Government can effectively police the ban on opium cultivation, the experts estimate that the peasants and the traffickers have concealed stockpiles that may be sufficient to feed the pipelines to Europe for another 2 to 4 years. That there will be some illicit production can also be taken for granted, and this, too, will feed the pipeline. More effective enforcement measures on both sides of the Turkish frontier will be necessary if the future flow is to be curbed.

There can be no question about the commitment of the Government and of the Turkish military establishment. However, they lack logistical equipment and sophisticated enforcement capabilities. We are now beginning to help them upgrade their capabilities. But the demands on them are going to be heavy. Not only will they have to police the activities of the smugglers and the criminal syndicates, but they will have to seek out the small fields in remote areas where the poppies will continue to be cultivated illicitly.

II. BULGARIA AND YUGOSLAVIA

Most of the morphine base carried overland by truck to Western Europe passes through Bulgaria or Greece and Yugoslavia. The morphine base, as well as increasing quantities of hashish, move for the most part in the sealed trucks, which under the so-called TIR agreement, are generally permitted to travel without intermediate customs inspection all the way from Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkey to Western Europe. TIR stands for Transport International Routière, or International Highway Transport. Everyone with whom we discussed the matter considered the TIR agreement economically essential from the standpoint of facilitating the movement of goods. But there was also general agreement that the hundreds of thousands of TIR trucks which move through Europe—sometime equipped with false bottoms or specially engineered compartments—provide the smugglers with formidable opportunities.

The Bulgarians are known to have made a number of seizures of morphine base and hashish. Also encouraging is the fact that both

Bulgaria and Yugoslavia have asked for American assistance in upgrading their customs capabilities. But they do not accept BNDD agents, and, as of today, they do not participate in any formal exchange of narcotics intelligence with the United States.

Over the past year there have been repeated reports that Turkish traffickers have been using Bulgaria as a safe haven from where they can direct their narcotics operations. Officials of several western countries have also expressed the belief that some Bulgarian Government officials may be actively involved in selling seized Turkish narcotics to French traffickers.

The Yugoslav Government has displayed an even more lackadaisical attitude towards the flow of narcotics through its territory to Western Europe. Until recent months, the number of Yugoslav customs officials remained roughly at pre-World War II levels, and only about 20 smugglers of drugs of all kinds were arrested each year. Worse still, smugglers who were caught received only 3 or 4 months in prison and moderate fines. There are widespread reports in the Austrian and Italian frontier areas of collusion between the smugglers and the Yugoslav military and customs officials. In addition to the Turkish and Afghan narcotics which are moving through Yugoslavia, there is also evidence of some smuggling into Western Europe of Yugoslav opium, grown in Macedonia.

These reports, I want to point out, are not the product of any on-the-spot inspection, because our task force did not visit Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. But I *can* attest that the things I have said here are generally believed by the officials of western countries concerned with the movement of narcotics, and that there appears to be some evidence to substantiate these reports.

If the Bulgarian and Yugoslav Governments consider these reports inaccurate or unfair, they can easily remedy the situation by embarking on a policy of full public disclosure on their anti-narcotics efforts, and by entering into a free exchange of narcotics intelligence with the United States and Western Europe. It would also help to dispel suspicions if they accounted to the International Narcotics Control Board for the manner in which they dispose of narcotics seizures.

There have been some items in the wind—in particular, some recent articles in the Yugoslav press—which suggest that Bulgaria and Yugoslavia are beginning to move in these directions.

I am sure that our hand will always be out to welcome such an initiative.

III. ITALY

Italy, because of its central geographic position, offers one of the most logical avenues for the flow of narcotics from the Middle East to France—and ultimately to the United States. Most of the TIR trucks in transit from the Middle East and the Balkans to Western Europe move through northern Italy. In addition, Italian ports are a traditional midway point for vessels sailing from the eastern Mediterranean to northern Europe and/or the Western Hemisphere.

Because of all this, Italy has been a major narcotics transit area for more than 15 years now, and all the indications are that the role it plays in the international movement of narcotics is still growing. Lately there have been some indications that instead of remaining a

passive transit area, Italy may be becoming an active drug brokerage country, like Germany.

Illicit narcotics from Turkey enter Italy via two primary routes—overland through Yugoslavia via Trieste and Gorizia, and by sea via the ports of Trieste, Venice, Naples, and Genoa.

A significant development in the drug traffic involving Italy is the increasing influx of Latin American cocaine. That the traffic is increasing is not surprising, in view of the extraordinarily high price fetched by cocaine in Italy. Heroin in Italy is usually priced at \$5,000 a kilogram. But the going price for cocaine, 70 to 80 percent pure, refined in South America, is from \$20,000 to \$25,000 a kilogram.

As recently as July 16th, a South American ring of cocaine smugglers was uncovered and cocaine valued at \$5 million was seized by the narcotics section of the *Guardia di Finanza*. The names of several Latin American cocaine traffickers known to the BNDD from previous operations were brought to light. These arrests put into the evidence the prominence of a Chilean-dominated smuggling ring which operates not only in the Western Hemisphere and the United States, but in Italy and other European countries as well.

I wish to submit for the files of the subcommittee a copy of a confidential official report dealing with the Chilean cocaine smuggling ring to which I have referred.

The activities of the Italian police have also uncovered some other interesting aspects of the drug traffic.

The Italian authorities interviewed strongly intimated that drugs play a major part in the activities of Italian revolutionary groups of Maoist orientation. As an example, they cited the free distribution of drugs to minors 14 years of age or even younger by members of what the Italians referred to as the extra-parliamentary left at a festival near Milan.

From interviews with several undercover agents in Milan it was learned that Yugoslavia plays a major role in the traffic of narcotics and, particularly, morphine base and cocaine in Italy.

Information obtained from an undercover agent revealed that two high ranking officers of the medical service of the Yugoslav Army were offering cocaine refined at the military hospital in Lubiana for the purpose of obtaining information of a military nature.

Although Italy has talented and highly efficient policemen, the apprehension and prosecution of drug traffickers is seriously handicapped by constitutional and organizational and legal weaknesses. In this respect, the situation bears many similarities to the situation in Germany.

Traditionally, the effort against drug trafficking in Italy had been the concern of the *Guardia di Finanza*, which, like all Italian national police units, is an agency organized along military lines and acts both as customs enforcement unit and as border guard. In time of war, the organization is mobilized as a military unit and, as such, has participated in most of the Italian wars.

The problem of drug abuse, as distinct from trafficking, was generally considered the province of the Italian national police—*Pubblica Sicurezza*—and specifically of the morals unit of the police prefectures.

A year ago, as a result of the upsurge of drug traffic and abuse in Italy, a third agency, the Carabinieri joined the effort against drug

abuse and trafficking. The Carabinieri is regarded as being by far the best equipped organization to collect and disseminate intelligence in addition to having a solid reputation for thoroughness and integrity.

The Italian law enforcement agencies, and especially the *Guardia di Finanza*, are so burdened with other tasks of law enforcement that only recently, because of the spectacular increase in drug trafficking, have they begun to devote major attention to the problem.

For instance, the *Guardia di Finanza* is charged with preventing the smuggling of items which are sold by the Italian state through its various monopolies. These items include cigarettes, common salt, matches, petroleum products and other goods subject to state monopoly.

Because tobacco is one of the main sources of revenue for the Italian state, the *Guardia di Finanza* not only has to assign men and means to prevent the smuggling of cigarettes into the country—which nevertheless is done on a large scale—but it also has to count and register every leaf of the tobacco plants growing in the country.

The other two agencies, particularly the Carabinieri, have such a wide scope of enforcing tasks that go from traffic to tax evasion, to counterespionage, plus so many ceremonial functions, that they are taxed to the breaking point.

Another serious handicap in the war against drug traffic and abuse in Italy has been the political instability that has reigned in the country for the last 10 years. In addition, the participation of the left Socialist Party in the government—and the Italians are quick to point out that this came about as the result of pressure by previous U.S. administrations—has brought forth legislation that has seriously reduced police powers.

One result has been that Italy at present may be the only country where police cannot interrogate a suspect after his arrest.

A law which went into effect a few years ago has practically eliminated the possibility of any investigative followup after the arrest of a criminal caught in *flagrante delicto*. No matter how painstaking the investigation by the police agency, he has to be turned over to the investigative attorney for interrogation and prosecution. Frequently, the police are not able to furnish the necessary details to the prosecuting attorney and, as a result, the criminal is acquitted for lack of evidence.

In matters of drug traffic investigation, where evidence and continuity of investigation are of paramount importance, this Italian law very frequently prevents the police agencies from obtaining convictions of drug traffickers because they are not in a position to elicit information from a suspect regarding a conspiracy.

Those who have the responsibility for dealing with the drug traffickers chafe over the handicaps under which they have to operate. But, for political reasons, there is no serious prospect of an early improvement in the situation. This is unfortunate, from the standpoint of Italy and from the standpoint of the international community.

V. GERMANY

There is general agreement that West Germany is becoming a strategic transit and storage area for morphine base originating in the Near and Middle East. International drug traffickers use the states

(or *laender*) of Bavaria and Hesse as storage points for morphine base and as locations where French purchasers can obtain the drug necessary for conversion into heroin in laboratories located in southern France.

The German authorities as recently as 2 years ago denied the existence of any drug problem within their jurisdiction and took a somewhat patronizing attitude toward the problem faced by U.S. drug agencies. Today, they are devoting their earnest efforts to combating a situation which they consider as their very own.

The drug problem is aggravated by the presence of some 2 million "*gästarbeiter*" or "guest workers" in Germany. These include Turks, Greeks, Yugoslavs, Italians, and Spaniards. Because of the affluence of the average German and the reluctance of the Germans to accept menial or unskilled labor jobs, the "*gästarbeiter*" have been imported to Germany in ever increasing numbers to fill the needs of jobs such as construction workers, sanitation workers, and unskilled workers in general.

According to the best estimates, there are approximately 700,000 Turkish "*gästarbeiter*" alone.

Recent seizures of hashish and morphine base in Germany indicate that drug traffickers of Turkish nationality have been able to operate with relative ease among the great mass of their compatriots, where they can find safety in numbers. Because of ethnic and language characteristics, the infiltration of ethnic smuggling rings is extremely difficult for the German police authorities to deal with.

Investigative efforts in the state of Hesse have brought to light the activities of several smuggling rings utilizing both German and foreign couriers.

One of these rings was operating in the Rhein-Main, and specifically in the city of Offenbach. Its leaders were identified as four Jordanian-born Palestinians, led by the Share brothers, all of them members of the Al Fatah and the Palestinian Liberation Front. The German investigative agencies estimate that more than 100 individuals have been identified as members of the ring. There is good reason to believe that part of the proceeds from the sales of narcotics goes to financing guerrilla activities against the State of Israel.

I submit for incorporation as an appendix excerpts from a report by the Hesse *Landeskriminalamt* regarding the operation of the ring.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, may this be received?

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

(The material referred to may be found in the appendix, p. 187.)

General WALT. The figures for drug delinquency and drug related offenses in Germany have shown a phenomenal increase from year to year. The year 1969 showed an increase of 151.8 percent over the previous year, while 1970 showed an increase of 238 percent over 1969. During 1970, 5,846 offenders were arrested in connection with the trafficking and smuggling of narcotics. Of this number, 1,045 were foreigners.

While the flow through Germany is mostly morphine base intended for French refineries, the smugglers have also been bringing in increasing amounts of cocaine for local consumption, and of hashish for both local consumption and re-export. Hashish seizures for 1970 were almost double the figure for 1969—4,332 kilos against 2,278 kilos. In

May of this year, BNDD agents in Munich assisted in the seizure of 400 kilos of hash intended for shipment to the United States. The hashish traffic is enormously profitable: Whereas a kilo of hash can be purchased in Pakistan for 200 German marks (\$65), it sells for 5,000 German marks, or approximately \$1,600 in West Germany.

The large increase in juvenile drug consumers in Germany is in line with the American experience. Their share in the total drug delinquency picture rose from 47.8 percent in 1969 to 67.3 percent in 1970. This is one of the chief reasons why the Germans now share our concern and share our commitment to an all-out war on drugs.

Unfortunately, there are certain legal and structural and organizational weaknesses that our German friends are going to have to overcome before they reach peak efficiency.

A serious matter is the handicap which the West Germans have imposed on themselves through a constitution which places primary responsibility for the prosecution of criminal offenses, including drug offenses, in the hands of the *laender*, or states, or in the hands of the local law enforcement authorities in the case of the large cities. The *Bundeskriminalamt*, or Federal Criminal Bureau, is granted arrest powers only in special cases, and then by special judicial authorization. What this means in practice is that, if a trafficker moves from one state to another, the police of state "A" cannot pursue the trafficker or the drugs to the territory of state "B," but must, instead, hand over the pursuit to the police authorities of state "B."

In a meeting with the German Federal narcotics authorities in Bonn on June 22, they informed me that they were all painfully aware of this difficulty, and that they hope to correct it. They also took advantage of our meeting to inform the American Embassy representatives of a very welcome development: Meeting in Bonn on the previous day, June 21, the interior ministers of the various *laender* had adopted a resolution urging that the Federal Criminal Bureau should be given original competence in all drug cases. They said that they expected a law to this effect to be enacted shortly.

The Germans now have a highly competent police force and customs force, well trained in the special stratagems of narcotics traffickers, and equipped with modern technology and a small battalion of trained dogs. But there is one more weakness they will have to overcome before they can deal effectively with the mounting drug problem in their own country.

Unlike British and French law, but very much like American law, the German law bends over backward to protect the rights of the accused. Night searches, for example, were completely forbidden under the law. Both the law and the judiciary took—and still take—an inexplicably lenient attitude toward drug trafficking offenses. Until last year, the maximum term handed down, even for the largest trafficker, was 3 years.

Speaking about this situation, Dr. Gemmer, the head of a West German delegation to an international seminar last September, apologized in these terms:

In respect to the punishment handed down by the German courts, I regret to say that at least until this past year, the duration of the terms of imprisonment imposed did by far not come up to the international average, and that insufficient allowance was made for the worldwide danger of the illicit traffic in narcotics.

Today the maximum penalty for the biggest traffickers caught in West Germany has been raised to 10 years—which in my eyes is still ludicrously insufficient.

The Germans are an energetic and a talented people and they have an exceptionally dedicated body of civil servants. But the best policemen and the best customs officers can have only limited effect if they have to function with a constitution and with laws and with courts that daily undermine their efforts.

This is the tragedy of West Germany today. But it is not an inescapable tragedy; it is, on the contrary, one that will respond to a few relatively simple measures. Perhaps the single most important measure would be to give the Federal Criminal Bureau jurisdiction over all offenses related to the drug traffic, in accordance with the resolution of the interior ministers of the German *laender*.

V. FRANCE

There is general agreement that France, in particular the Marseilles area, has been the immediate source of some 80 percent of the heroin coming into the United States. Since the beginning of this year alone, the French police have closed down four heroin labs in the vicinity of Marseilles, but, although no one knows the count for sure, the assumption is that there still are another eight or 10 in operation.

The tremendous concentration of heroin traffickers and heroin refineries in the Marseilles area is not an accident. The development of an enterprise as tricky and as complicated as the international heroin traffic requires an experienced criminal infrastructure—and there is no city anywhere in Europe that has a criminal infrastructure that can begin to compare with the Corsican underground in the port of Marseilles.

More than half the population of Marseilles is French Corsican. The majority of the Corsicans are ordinarily law-abiding citizens. But there is something about the Corsican mentality that makes many of them seek adventure in the ranks of crime, while others seek adventure in the police force. In fact, there is a saying in France that the Corsicans make both the best crooks and the best cops.

There are some who believe that there is an organization called the *Union Corse*, or the "Corsican Union," which ties the entire Corsican criminal underworld together, in the manner of the Mafia. The majority of the French and American narcotics agents, however, believe that, instead of one big syndicate, the Corsicans operate through a fairly large number of small and intermediate syndicates. On one point there is complete agreement: there is a tremendous sense of ethnic and familial solidarity among the Corsicans, and the Corsican criminal, when he is apprehended, is far more difficult to break down and far less prone to "sing" about his confederates than are the Mafiosi.

Only a year ago, the French were the butt of all kinds of criticism in the United States because of a dearth of dramatic action against the traffickers. They had signed a joint agreement with the United States on February 26, 1971, calling for—I quote—"the coordination of preventive and repressive action against the illicit narcotic and dangerous drug traffic." But when several months went by and there was no dramatic action, a lot of people concluded that the French

weren't motivated, that they weren't trying. Actually, we were all somewhat late in waking up to the danger posed by the drug menace. We in America woke up to the danger when, over a period of several years, the number of American drug addicts grew by several hundred thousand. The French woke up to the danger shortly after we did, when there were a number of heroin overdose deaths involving the children of prominent families, and when several surveys established that France was beginning to have a serious addiction problem, with possibly as many as 25,000 by the latter part of 1971.

I believe that a number of American Ambassadors—and I would rate Ambassador Watson as one of the foremost of these—have played an important role in expediting and encouraging cooperative action against the international drug traffic. By and large, however, the French Government and other friendly governments were prompt in giving us their political and moral commitments, and speedy in conceiving and implementing affirmative programs of drug abuse control.

It takes time, however, to get an operation into high gear. Since entering into the joint agreement with the United States in February 1971, the French Government has increased its special antinarcotics contingent from 6 to 60 agents in the Marseilles area, and from 10 to 70 agents in the Paris area. The first major break came last March when French customs agents became suspicious of the behavior of the shrimp boat *Caprice des Temps*, as it moved to leave Marseilles harbor. When they searched it, they found the biggest haul of pure heroin in history—913 pounds. I spent about a half-hour inspecting this boat when I was in Marseilles in June, and I want to take my hat off to the French customs inspectors for a first rate job of detective work—because the heroin wasn't just hidden away—it was imbedded in several tons of concrete ballast.

Since that time there have been a whole series of substantial seizures of heroin and a total of 4 heroin labs have been closed down. Finding these labs is exceedingly difficult, because the equipment can be accommodated in small, isolated quarters. This is something that was driven home dramatically when I was taken to see the first lab the French police had seized, in the wake of the shrimp boat episode. The lab—which had a capacity, I was told, of several thousand kilograms a year—was housed in a small, innocent looking country cottage, along a narrow isolated country road, with similar peaceful-looking cottages in the vicinity.

French narcotics laws are tough, and they are toughly enforced. I shall have more to say about this in my closing remarks, dealing with the question of law enforcement.

Everyone in our Paris Embassy, from Ambassador Watson down to the most junior of our BNDD agents, had nothing but the highest praise for the cooperation they are getting from the French authorities. This cooperation was broadened and formalized at the Franco-Canadian-American Conference on Drug Repression, held in Ottawa on June 8-9, 1972. At this conference, the French position was put in these words by M. Gevraudau, the Deputy General Director of the French Judiciary Police: "The principle that must guide us all in the task of drug law enforcement is that 'we are all of the same house.'"

Mr. Chairman, I wish to submit for publication in the appendix to this record a copy of the agreement concluded on February 26, 1971,

between the Director General of the French National Police and our own BNDD.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, may it be received?

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

(The material referred to may be found in the Appendix, p. 188.)

VI. MEXICO

General WALT. Because of its geographic location, its long stretches of coastline virtually without surveillance of any kind, and its 2,000-mile land frontier with the United States, Mexico is an ideal staging area for the smuggling of drugs into the United States. Through Mexico, therefore, comes heroin from Marseilles, cocaine from South America, and hashish from Central Asia.

Mexico also has an important producing capability of its own. It is the source of the bulk of the marihuana which enters the United States, as well as a certain percentage of the hashish.

Mexico is also one of the few, if not the only, Latin American country that grows opium poppy in considerable quantity and has labs to refine opium into heroin. This heroin is of a brownish color and, according to some reports, is preferred by addicts because of its reputed purity.

The opium is grown by poor peasants in poppy plantations on isolated hillsides of the Sierra Madre Occidental—Mexico's western mountain range—and of the Guerrero Mountains in the south. The main opium-growing States are Sonora, Sinaloa, Nayarit, and Guerrero.

The peasants are normally contacted by narcotics dealers who provide them with poppy seeds free of charge, and who return after the harvest to purchase the opium—at a very, very low price. The opium is refined into heroin in numerous small laboratories, particularly in the State of Sinaloa. Most of this heroin is targeted at the addict populations in the American West and Southwest—primarily in the cities of San Diego, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Seattle, Denver, Phoenix, Albuquerque, Houston, Fort Worth, and Dallas. A good deal has also been coming into the United States via Miami. The heroin is brought into the United States by trucks and cars and light planes, by small boats which frequently pick up their loads at sea, and by travelers on commercial airlines.

The Mexican Government has always been unhappy about the opium-heroin situation, and during the fifties and sixties, in sporadic campaigns, it destroyed many thousands of small plantations. But the effort was not sustained enough or of sufficient intensity, and Mexico, until recently, appeared to be walking but moving backward on a moving treadmill. Indeed, 3 years ago the situation in Mexico verged on the uncontrollable.

Over the past 3 years, however, there has been a marked improvement, and the Mexican authorities now appear to be gaining some ground in the difficult fight against the opium and marihuana growers, and the drug traffickers—yes, and against corruption among government and law enforcement officials.

The turn around began with "Operation Intercept," which was launched in the summer of 1969—and during the height of which

cars were backed up for miles from the American border, with boiling radiators and fuming drivers, and fuming Mexican officials as well. There followed agreements between the U.S. Department of Justice and the Mexican Minister of Justice—and there began a new era which is now referred to on both sides as "Operation Cooperation." In consequence of these agreements, a generous contingent of American BNDD agents moved into Mexico, and are now scattered around the country, assisting and encouraging the Mexican authorities, providing them with narcotics intelligence, and helping them to upgrade their own capabilities.

I know that there has been a good deal of impatience in our country with the situation in Mexico. People are aware that marihuana and heroin are produced in Mexico and that it has been coming across the border in quite large quantities for years. And they arrive at the facile conclusion that this situation wouldn't exist if the Mexican authorities decided to clamp down on it. Well, it just isn't that easy.

Again, I would like to remind the subcommittee of the difficulties we had in our own country at the time of prohibition. And, Mexico, I assure you, is a far more difficult country to police than the United States ever was. It is a land where the *bandido* tradition is strong, and where bands of armed poppy farmers frequently shoot things out with the Federal Judicial Police. As for the terrain, it's just about the most jagged and inaccessible to be found anywhere in the world.

I flew over some of the opium growing areas in the Guerrero Mountains. I've flown over a lot of very rough terrain in my years with the U.S. Marines—but I honestly don't believe I've ever seen a rougher or more difficult landscape than Guerrero. In places the nearest roads were 50 or more miles away, there were no trails in evidence, and there wasn't even a small pad of land level enough to land a helicopter. But on steep hillsides, there were poppy fields. After these poppy fields have been located by spotter aircraft, it sometimes takes days for the Mexican soldiers to reach them by overland trek so that they can destroy the fields.

There have been a number of attempts to use herbicides, but the problem is complicated by the widespread occurrence of updrafts in the mountain areas.

The Mexicans are a proud and sensitive people, and I am inclined to agree with those on our embassy staff who hold that excessively harsh criticism or finger shaking can be distinctly counterproductive in dealing with them. The Mexican authorities do not like the image of Mexico as a supplier of drugs to the United States, and they are worried, too, about the growing problem of drugs among their own youth. They have plenty of motivation of their own for clamping down on drug production and drug traffic—and they are beginning to do so.

The last year and a half, in particular, have shown some impressive results. Let me give you just a few basic figures for the period December 1, 1970, to May 31, 1972:

Poppy fields destroyed.....	936.
Poppy seeds seized.....	250 kilograms.
Marihuana destroyed.....	300 metric tons.
Marihuana fields destroyed.....	4,500.
Heroin seized.....	43 kilograms.
Cocaine seized.....	200 kilograms.

These operations resulted in the arrest of 1,894 Mexicans, 873 foreigners, and the deportation of 397 individuals. Mexican authorities also seized 349 vehicles, 13 light aircraft, and three vessels.

It is important to observe that the entire operation is still gathering momentum, and that there is every reason to anticipate even more impressive results over the coming period. With American assistance, the Mexican Government has purchased jeeps and light aircraft and helicopters and communications equipment, most of which is just beginning to become operational. The narcotics contingents in the customs service and in the Federal police have been increased in size, and are constantly improving in capability. On top of this, it is known to every Government official that President Echeverria has made a total personal commitment to the war on drugs, and that Government officials are going to be marked on how well they perform in this war.

According to the narcotics officers in the American Embassy in Mexico, they are now receiving excellent cooperation from the Mexican law enforcement authorities, and when they provide intelligence to the authorities, action follows. Nor was there any foot dragging in the case of a nationally prominent Mexican, Manuel Dominguez Suarez, one-time head of the Federal Judicial Police, when he was arrested in Texas in 1970. (This was one of the major heroin cases described to the subcommittee in the course of yesterday's session.) As soon as they were informed, the Mexican authorities raided Suarez' home and seized his documents, and cooperated in an expeditious and wholehearted manner which won the admiration and gratitude of the American investigators.

The laws on the books in Mexico appear to be adequate to deal with the problem although they are not always evenly enforced. The law enforcement authorities in Mexico are probably hindered rather than assisted by the fact that Mexican law does not differentiate between hard drugs and marihuana or between trafficking and possession. Thus the penalties meted out for violations of Mexican drug abuse laws are frequently extremely harsh—especially when it concerns minor offenders. This is something that some hundreds of young Americans have discovered to their great regret.

For example, three U.S. citizens were arrested in Yucatan on February 11, 1971, with a small amount of marihuana. As a result of interrogation, Mexican Federal Judicial Police seized an approximate ton of marihuana from their suppliers. The investigation involved farmers, transporters, purchasers, and financial backers in Mexico and the United States. In May of this year the three U.S. citizens received sentences of 11, 7½, and 4½ years. According to Mexican law, a sentence of over 5 years is not bailable. The party receiving 4½ years posted bail and returned to the United States.

There remains the universal question of corruption which affects all countries in varying degree, and poor countries as a rule more than rich countries. Unquestionably there exists a good deal of corruption and official involvement with the traffickers at lower levels in Mexico, and it would be safe to assume that some officials at intermediate level are also involved. To deal with the lower level problem—which is by far the larger—it has been suggested that customs and police officers who are instrumental in making drug seizures or arresting traffickers or closing heroin labs be given generous bonuses—similar to the

bonuses received by Mexican customs officers for making seizure of commercial contraband. To me, this proposal makes a lot of sense.

Our border with Mexico is a long and difficult one, and it's going to require a stepped up effort on both sides to bring this border under more effective control. But I am convinced from everything I learned in Mexico that Operation Cooperation is alive and well, and that, together, our two Governments are beginning to make progress in dealing with this common problem.

CANADA

The Port of Montreal on the east coast is a major point of entry to the North American Continent for European heroin, while Vancouver, on the west coast, is a point of entry for increasing quantities of heroin arriving by ship and by plane from the Far East. Montreal has also been a funnel for large quantities of hashish, some shipped directly from Afghanistan-Pakistan, some of it transshipped via Western European countries. The importance of Canada in the transshipment process is illustrated by the case of Louis Cirillo who over a period of some 17 months is estimated to have brought almost a thousand kilograms of heroin into the United States, some directly, some through Mexico, but at least half of it through Canada.

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) ranks as one of the most motivated and efficient law enforcement forces in the world. In certain areas, however, they are also one of the most overworked. In combatting the influx of narcotics into Canada, they have until very recently borne the entire burden of the battle. There were no drug squads on the metropolitan police or provincial police forces, so the RCMP had to deal not only with traffickers but also with street pushers. Of the 50 men on the RCMP drug squad, over 20 are assigned to street groups.

The Canadian Customs force is also badly overextended. For example, to examine the large volume of new and privately owned cars which enter Canada through the port of Montreal, customs has only two men armed with screwdrivers. This, despite the fact that automobiles—especially used ones—are frequently used to bring in large quantities of concealed heroin, skillfully hidden away in body cavities. This situation, perhaps, encouraged convicted trafficker Louis Cirillo, to bring some of his heroin-bearing cars into the continent via Montreal, from where they proceeded to New York. One of Cirillo's cars, a 1947 Cadillac, which got by Montreal Customs and was later nabbed in New York, carried 245 lbs. of heroin in its heating coil.

It is the hope of the Canadian authorities that, with the help of two heroin-sniffing dogs now on duty in Montreal, they will be able to deal more effectively with the problem of heroin caches in incoming automobiles.

The scale of the burgeoning hashish traffic may be gaged from a few recent seizures. In July of 1971 a Congolese diplomat, Marcel Muepu-Sampu, was stopped with 110 pounds of hashish in his bags. It was established that he had made four previous trips from the Middle East to New York City, on each of which there is reason to presume that he brought in quantities of hashish.

In February of 1971, a Lebanese Roman Catholic priest—a genuine priest, not a simulated one—was found to have 87 pounds of hashish in his bag. The priest was on in years, and he had to walk with the help of a walking cane. The customs officers could hardly be blamed if they failed to be suspicious. As a matter of fact, the customs officer who finally nabbed him recalled that he had passed the same Roman Catholic reverend on three or four previous trips to Montreal, and that he had personally carried his bag to the cab because he felt sorry for him.

Early this year 160 lbs. of hashish was discovered inside the body of a 1960 Bentley car.

More recently, on June 24, 1972, the Canadian authorities confiscated 240 pounds of hashish concealed in parcels arriving from Afghanistan via Kashmir.

The Canadian courts deal very sternly with traffickers. In the great majority of cases bail is denied. The sentences handed down, even in cases involving small amounts of heroin, generally range from 7 to 15 years. But in one recent case which involved only 3½ pounds of heroin, the judge imposed life sentences on two of the principals. I shall have more to say about law enforcement in Canada at a later point in my testimony.

While Canada does not have a heroin epidemic on the scale of the American epidemic, the problem has been assuming increasing importance over the past few years. Three years ago, according to estimates, there were only 100 heroin addicts in Montreal. Today there are somewhere between 700 and 1,000. In Vancouver, according to some reports, the situation is almost as bad as it is in New York City.

There is the closest cooperation between the BNDD representatives in Canada and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and this cooperation, especially over the past year, has resulted in a number of spectacular breaks against the drug traffickers.

Canada merits the highest possible rating, indeed, on the quality of both its cooperation and its law enforcement. The one weakness—and there is some reason to hope that this will shortly be remedied—is the shortage of manpower.

LATIN AMERICA

As a matter of strategy the traffickers try to come at the United States from as many different directions as possible. In consequence of the tightening controls in Canada and Mexico, a number of Latin American cities have assumed increasing importance as transshipment points for European heroin targeted at the United States. The traffic is particularly active through Panama; Curacao; Santiago, Chile; Asuncion, Paraguay; Buenos Aires, Argentina; Sao Paulo, Brazil; and Bogota, Colombia. While Mexico is estimated to account for some 20 percent of the heroin which enters the United States, other hemispheric countries—in the Caribbean and in Central and South America—are estimated to account for an aggregate of 30–35 percent of all the heroin that comes into the United States.

The drugs arrive in Latin America by both ship and plane. When it comes to moving the heroin into the United States, private planes and body carriers traveling as passengers on commercial airlines are

the chief means of transportation. The air smugglers, who include many American soldiers of fortune, sometimes brazenly use commercial airports, with the complicity of corrupt officials. They also operate out of hundreds of clandestine landing strips in Latin America, and use private or clandestine strips in southern Texas or Florida to effect their deliveries. For example, in October 1970 five Paraguayans and a Frenchman arrived at a small airport in Florida from South America aboard a Cessna 210 airplane. Stowed away on the plane was 94 pounds of heroin.

Smugglers flying in private planes will sometime cover enormous distances. These are records of flights originating in Santiago, Chile, which had to make waystops in three or four countries along their 4,000-mile route before reaching the United States.

There appears to be a close tie-in between the heroin traffic and the cocaine traffic—which is not at all surprising since the same criminal machinery can be used for both purposes. One of the largest operations, headquartered in Santiago, Chile, and which has branches or contacts throughout Latin America and Europe has, according to BNDD estimates, been responsible for moving up to 500 kilograms of heroin and cocaine into the United States each month. The proceeds are used to purchase arms, cigarettes and electronic parts, which are then moved back into Latin America.

Plugging all of these leaks in the international system of defense against the heroin traffic will require a tremendous amount of effort and persistence and ingenuity. It will also require a far greater degree of cooperation than currently exists with some of our neighbors to the south.

HEROIN : THE SOUTHEAST ASIA-HONG KONG CONNECTION

Until recently Southeast Asia heroin—the bulk of which comes from Burma—accounted for only a small portion of the aggregate amount of heroin arriving in the United States. Estimates ranged from a low of 4 percent to a high of 15 percent. There is general agreement among the experts that increasing amounts are now entering the United States via a variety of routes.

In part, this is due to the growing demand in the United States, in part, it is due to a large oversupply of white heroin in the Southeast Asia laboratories—the result of the rapid withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam. Moreover, Turkey's decision to phase out of opium production will result—probably within the coming year but certainly over the next 2 or 3 years—in a marked decrease in the flow of heroin from Europe to the United States. This is bound to serve as a further stimulus to the Southeast Asia heroin producers.

Southeast Asia heroin reaches the United States by several major routes and transport techniques.

As the testimony given on the *William Herman Jackson* case established, Jackson—an enterprising ex-GI—was able over a period of several years to smuggle in possibly more than 200 kilos of heroin from Bangkok to the United States. This he did using body carriers on active duty military personnel, military cargo aircraft, and the APO system. A 20-pound shipment sent by his group was intercepted at Walter Reed

Army Hospital, and another shipment of 17 pounds was intercepted in an Army classified mail pouch at Fort Monmouth, N.J.

Over the past year an increasing volume of heroin has been shipped to the United States by ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs in the Far East—the majority of them in Hong Kong and Bangkok. These traffickers have correspondent traffickers in the United States and Canada. They send the heroin sometimes by seamen couriers who carry from 1 to 5 kilograms, sometimes concealed in household goods of Chinese immigrants, or in furniture shipped to the United States, or, on a few occasions, in the baggage of diplomats. Thus, on November 11, 1971, a Philippine diplomat, Domingo Cameso, was arrested in New York with 17 kilograms of Southeast Asia heroin. The investigation established that his controller was an ethnic Chinese businessman in Bangkok.

Already this year, 17 Chinese seamen—most of them members of the Hong Kong Seamen's Union—have been arrested in the United States for attempting to smuggle in heroin. In one case, on April 11 of this year, 7 Chinese seamen were arrested in New York, with a total load of 11 pounds of heroin. The investigation established that their operation was part of a larger operation which had shipped 100 pounds from Bangkok to the United States.

In most cases the amount carried is from 1 to 5 kilos. However, in a few cases seamen have carried up to 10 kilos, and in one case 20 kilos.

Since it must be taken for granted that at least 5 to 10 times the amount seized succeeds in getting through, Chinese seamen must now be considered a major source of the heroin entering the United States. (There were several thousand Chinese ship-jumpers in the United States last year—most of them originating in Hong Kong.)

To deal with this situation, customs and BNDD earlier this year launched a specialized operation which they called "Operation Seawall."

HONG KONG

The Port of Hong Kong is without question one of the world's great drug centers, and a prime transit center through which Southeast Asian heroin moves to the rest of the world.

The British administration must be given the highest praise for integrity, and the British-officered police and customs must be given equally high praise for professional competence. If the situation is bad in Hong Kong, it is because of a complex of circumstances beyond their control.

First of all, there is Hong Kong's role as a traditional consumer of narcotics—which is a tragic inheritance from the past. The government authorities admit to an addict population of at least 80,000 in a population of 4,000,000—which would be like an addict population of 2,000,000 in the United States. The majority of these use No. 3 smoking heroin, which is about 40 percent pure, instead of the No. 4 white heroin which is used in this country. A dose of heroin costs only \$2 to \$3 in Hong Kong—but marihuana costs about \$10 for a matchbox full.


Secondly, it is exceedingly difficult to cope with the influx of Southeast Asian opium via an unknown number of the 11,000 junks that constantly move in and out of Hong Kong's waters. The opium comes from Southeast Asia via Thai fishing trawlers which haul about 2 tons

of opium per load, and which sometimes carry quantities of morphine base and heroin as well. Sometimes the Chinese junks rendezvous at sea with the Thai trawlers, outside the operational limits of the Hong Kong Protective Service. In other instances, the Thai trawlers will drop their cargo at sea at a given rendezvous, where it is picked up a short while later by the Chinese junks.

Southeast Asian heroin, and morphine base which is refined into heroin in numerous small laboratories scattered through Hong Kong, are brought into Hong Kong in much more substantial quantities by air and by freighter. Hong Kong authorities do not have the faintest idea of how much heroin is imported, but in the case of morphine base they venture the estimate of 4 to 5 tons annually. This is a truly enormous amount—the equivalent of one-third of heroin consumption in the United States. Some of this is consumed locally, but the bulk of it, obviously, is exported.

Incidentally, when I spoke of small heroin laboratories the Senators may not have realized just how compact such a lab can be. I show you here a photograph of the apparatus used to equip a Hong Kong heroin laboratory. All of it can be fitted into a very tiny room—and such a lab, I am told, could have a capacity of several hundreds kilos of heroin a year.

(The photograph referred to follows.)



Equipment normally used by Hong Kong heroin laboratories

The third handicap under which the Hong Kong authorities must operate is the almost irresistible attraction Hong Kong offers to international narcotics traffickers. Each year, 7,000 oceangoing vessels arrive in Hong Kong, carrying approximately 23 million tons of cargo and over 24,000 passengers. Hong Kong Airport is serviced by 28 international lines, with more than 400 outgoing flights weekly. Each year some 2.3 million passengers pass through the airport terminal, going in both directions. On top of this, Hong Kong is an exceed-

ingly active financial center where traffickers can always find funds—for a price—to finance any operation—large, small, or intermediate.

The fourth handicap under which the Hong Kong customs—or the Hong Kong Protective Service, as it is called—must work is the impossible burden of traffic passing through one of the busiest ports in the world. To cope with this traffic, the Protective Service has a total establishment of less than 1,000 men, of whom some 700 have a dual function connected with both excise and narcotics or are directly engaged in narcotics interdiction. The number on effective duty at any given time is further reduced by sickness, by attendance at court, and by other official activities that inevitably follow the discovery of any quantity of narcotics.

The final and most important handicap under which the Hong Kong authorities must work is the fact that British Hong Kong survives by the sufferance of Peking, and they simply cannot afford a confrontation. For this reason, they operate under instructions—explicit or implicit—never to search mainland Chinese ships or mainland cargoes. Their position is further complicated by the fact that there are in Hong Kong several shipping companies known to be owned or controlled by Peking, which, between them, operate over a hundred vessels on international routes.

In the face of this formidable array of handicaps, the Hong Kong Protective Service performs with truly admirable diligence and thoroughness. They make files on every vessel using the port. These files contain details on ship's officers and crew members, on voyage itineraries, on the criminal records of ships, on every seizure and hiding place discovered. When there is reason for suspicion—and when the ship does not fly Peking's flag—specially trained squads of agents will search ships with incredible expertise. On one occasion they found a quantity of heroin stashed away inside a ship's engine. Their total narcotics haul last year included 13,000 pounds of opium and three heroin labs.

But while the Hong Kong narcotics agents have been working their heads off, and while they have succeeded in making a goodly number of seizures, their efforts are partly nullified by the unbelievably lenient sentences handed down to drug traffickers by the Hong Kong judiciary.

For example, John Vincent Evans III, an American, was arrested on April 26, 1971, for the possession of 1 pound of No. 3 heroin. He was sentenced to 8 months imprisonment; Joseph Edward Hilton, another American, was arrested on September 22, 1971, for the possession of 2½ pounds of opium and ¾ ounces of heroin. He pleaded guilty, was given an 18-month suspended sentence, and voluntarily departed from Hong Kong.

In early June of this year, while I was in Hong Kong, the court handed down a verdict in the case of two Chinese fishermen found guilty of trafficking in 744 kilograms (1,600 pounds), of raw opium and 23 kilograms (57 pounds), of morphine base. The total worth of these drugs in Hong Kong was \$6 million. Converted into heroin, it would have been worth close to \$40 million in the United States. But despite the astronomical quantities of drugs involved, the judge sentenced the Chinese fishermen to only 6 years imprisonment each.



On February 14, 1972, two Chinese males were arrested for illegal importation of narcotics into Hong Kong. The consignment was recovered from the seabed in the international water and smuggled into Hong Kong territorial water where it was dumped in Ting Kok New Territories. This consignment was later recovered by the police, consisting of about 1,800 lbs. of raw opium and 55 lbs. of morphine. Picture shows the consignment soon after it was recovered by the police



Picture shows the narcotics consignment after recovered by the police in Ting Kok New Territories. It was then unwrapped exposing a number of two-kilo packets of raw opium

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Our consular officials in Hong Kong have let the British judiciary know on repeated occasions that in American eyes the inordinately lenient sentences which they are handing down serve to undermine the war on the drug traffickers. British law enforcement officials are just as unhappy about the situation as our own consular personnel. But nothing seems to budge the Hong Kong judiciary.

I believe that this is a deplorable situation, and that it warrants discussion at the highest level with the British Government.

Mr. Chairman, while I was in Hong Kong I asked the American consulate to prepare for me a summary of the disposition of recent narcotic cases by the Hong Kong courts. I have already made reference to several of these cases, but I would like to submit for publication as an appendix to this record the complete text of the summary which I received from the American consular officials who have been following the problem.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, may this document be received for the record?

The CHAIRMAN. It may be received for publication in the appendix, as General Walt has requested.

(The material referred to may be found in the appendix, p. 191.)

HEROIN AND HASHISH: THE AFGHANISTAN-PAKISTAN CONNECTION

General WALT. Both Afghanistan and Pakistan produce significant quantities of illicit opium. Pakistan's illicit production is estimated to range from 20 to 160 metric tons annually. Afghan production is estimated at 100. These are necessarily very rough estimates, because most of the opium is grown on small plots by primitive tribesmen in the inhospitable mountain area on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan frontier, where neither the Pakistan nor Afghanistan Governments exercise any really effective authority.

For the time being, little of this opium reaches the Western World. Most of it is targeted at local or nearby markets, with Iran the chief victim country.

As the Iranians crack down and as the potential market in Europe for morphine base increases, it is only a matter of time before the Afghan opium merchants realize that by refining the opium gum to morphine base before it leaves Afghanistan, they have a much more readily concealed product which can bring them much higher profits in the West. It is believed that with the increased influx of organized Western criminals into Afghanistan, this trend will increase significantly.

Much more important in terms of its immediate impact on the United States and the Western World is the growing traffic in hashish which has its prime origin in the Afghanistan-Pakistan area. Hashish is the resin of the cannabis, or hemp, plant. It is far more potent and destructive than marihuana because it has a concentration of 10 percent THC (which stands for tetrahydrocannabinol) as against an ordinary concentration of 2 percent of THC in marihuana.

The use of hashish goes back far in history. A recent report of the New York County Medical Society noted that "the habitual use of hashish is definitely associated with criminality, violence, and insanity." There wasn't anything new about this finding. The capacity of

hashish to induce violent behavior was noted many hundreds of years ago; indeed, the ancient word "assassin" is derived from "hashish."

In countries like Germany, England, and Canada, hashish is far more common than marihuana. It is, in fact, the drug of preference of those who have not yet graduated to heroin. In the United States, "hash" is becoming increasingly available at teenage parties.

In 1969, hashish seizures at our ports and borders totaled only 579 pounds. But for fiscal year 1971 the seizures had mounted to 2,204 pounds—and for 1972, they had soared to 9,456 pounds. In addition, most of the 10,000 lbs. of hashish seized in Western Germany last year was clearly targeted at the United States. These figures suggest that hashish may be getting into our country at a current flow rate of up to 200,000 pound a year. This high figure is substantially greater than the estimated consumption of hashish in Egypt during the worst years of its hashish epidemic.

The hashish trade will probably continue to burgeon, first because of its great popularity, and second, because of the enormous profits involved, from the initial grower all the way up to the final vendor. In Afghanistan, the grower can earn \$600 per hectare, as against \$300 for opium, \$175 for fruit, and about \$100 for wheat.

On a shipment of 50 kilos from Afghanistan to Montreal or New York, all operating expenses will average \$10,000. In Montreal or New York the hashish wholesales at about \$1,800 a kilo. The group grosses \$90,000 and nets \$80,000 on the 50 kilo shipment. One U.S. gang recently apprehended in Canada was caught with 800 pounds and a second shipment of 400 pounds was confiscated. They had stood to gross about \$1,800,000 from those two shipments.

Liquid or distilled hashish, having a potency and value much higher than standard hashish, has been encountered increasingly over the past year. A BNDD investigation which culminated in a joint raid by BNDD and the Kabul Police netted a distillery with 25 gallons of liquid hashish with a potential worth of \$6 million on U.S. streets. The operators were American members of the California and Hawaii-based Brotherhood of Eternal Love. Their papers showed many round-the-world trips, accommodations in the best hotels, false documentation, including passports, selective service registrations, drivers licenses, et cetera. One was carrying over \$8,000 in cash with him.

THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN

Prospects for early improvement in the situation in Afghanistan are not very bright. A year ago the Afghans did not even acknowledge the existence of a narcotics problem in Afghanistan or the cultivation of the opium poppy there. Today, at least they acknowledge it and they are willing to discuss ways and means of combatting it.

On paper the Afghan Government can make a good case for itself. It will tell you that they have:

1. Sent a delegation to the single convention conference in Geneva in March 1972 which was generally cooperative with us, although concerned about (a) erosion of national sovereignty and (b) giving any commitment on enforcement which the Afghan Government might find it impossible to carry out. The government is now studying the report of its delegation as well as the texts of the conference results in

order to determine whether to accept the proposed amendments to the single convention.

2. Joined the Ad Hoc Committee on Illicit Traffic in the Middle East of the U.N. Commission on Narcotic Drugs, officially as an observer, but with an agreement that they would chair any meetings of the committee held in Afghanistan.

3. Established two cabinet committees—to explore, report on, and make recommendations concerning opium and hashish cultivation, trafficking, medicinal use, crop substitution, and improved laws and enforcement.

4. Ordered the urgent drafting of a comprehensive narcotics law to supplement the 1957 law banning opium cultivation and the 1970 law on smuggling.

5. Established a special tribunal to hear narcotics cases.

6. Requested the UNFEDAC (U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control) to send a team of agricultural experts to Afghanistan to study the problem of crop substitution, especially in Bдахshan Province, and make recommendations.

All of this sounds impressive. But the performance leaves much to be desired. In part, the difficulty stems from the fact that Afghanistan has so pathetically little ability to perform.

Afghanistan is a very underdeveloped country which was not colonized by the European powers in the 19th century. This means that today it has neither a legacy of a civil service nor a developed national infrastructure system of transportation and communications networks nor basic industries.

Basic problems of underdevelopment have been aggravated by a 2-year drought which has severely taxed the resources of the Afghanistan Government. Additional foreign aid has been forthcoming to assist the emergency program of the government. However, the Afghan bureaucracy has not been able to cope successfully with these economic problems, and other difficulties have arisen which have together created a most difficult domestic political situation for Prime Minister Zahir. Reports of some impending change in government have further rendered the ministers helpless. In this milieu few decisions are being made. Only the most urgent problems as seen from an Afghan point of view are being actively considered.

Police capabilities are meager and corruption is rife. Afghan police are drawn from the bottom 10 percent of the army conscripts. A patrolman receives about 80 cents a month salary and the director general of police \$40 a month. The literacy rate of the Afghan police is estimated to be about 2 percent. Their record system is virtually non-existent. Persons are sentenced to prison terms with no record being kept of their length of sentence or date of release. Murders of foreigners are sometimes not investigated, even in Kabul. In the provinces even the inept efforts practiced in Kabul are virtually nonexistent. Lack of authority, knowhow, initiative, and equipment reduces the police virtually to a token presence. The West German police have been training the Afghan police for 14 years, both in Afghanistan and in Germany. But police salaries and national traditions are so inimical to efficient performance, that there are clear limits to the improvements that may reasonably be expected.

From my conversations with the Minister of the Interior and the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in Pakistan I received an ambivalent impression. On the one hand, I had the impression that they were unhappy about the situation and that they wanted to do something. On the other hand, I had the feeling that they felt frustrated and helpless to the point of being unmotivated. And, needless to say, without motivation there can be no serious improvement in the situation.

While the situation is difficult, I do not believe it is hopeless. With diplomacy, with the assistance of other nations, with intelligently conceived aid programs, and with some prodding, there is some reason to hope that the Afghan borders can be brought under control.

I want to close by saying that Ambassador Neumann and his Embassy narcotics team deserve the highest rating for the quality and persistence of their efforts vis-a-vis the Afghanistan Government.

COCAINE: THE LATIN AMERICAN CONNECTION

Our task force, regrettably, did not have the time to visit South America to look into the problem of cocaine production and smuggling. But I feel that this report would be incomplete without a reference to the cocaine situation, first because cocaine is an exceedingly dangerous and psychologically addictive drug, and, second because it has been entering the United States at a rapidly accelerated rate. Indeed, according to recent evidence, the use of cocaine is increasing at a rate which may soon make it second only to marihuana in frequency of abuse.

Cocaine seizures 10 years ago ran only a few kilograms a year. But in 1971 over 280 kilograms, or 616 pounds, were seized, while in early 1972 a single shipment of 203 pounds was seized in Miami aboard a private plane arriving from Chile.

Because of its hallucinogenic qualities, cocaine is widely used by the many young people who turn to drugs in the belief that they can thereby expand their consciousness. And because it is a stimulant with some reputation as an aphrodisiac, it is also widely used by those young people who turn to drugs for simple "kicks."

Some people turn to cocaine in preference to heroin because it is not supposed to be physically addictive. Nothing could be more deceptive than the tenuous division between "physically addictive" drugs and "psychologically addictive" drugs. It is true that a cocaine user who decides to terminate the habit will not experience the paroxysms of agony which characterize withdrawal from heroin. But the violent depression which follows hard on the heels of cocaine stimulation, creates an almost irresistible psychological compulsion to seek a revival of the euphoria in a new administration of cocaine. For this reason, according to some authorities, a person can become an addict, for all practical purposes, after only a few days of exposure to cocaine.

Apart from the terrible things it does to the mind, cocaine is extremely destructive physically. Taken in large doses, it can depress respiratory and heart functions to the point where death results. In regular doses over a sustained period, its lethal effect on the body tissues manifests itself in internal bleeding and in the decay of the inner nasal structure.

Cocaine is derived primarily from the coca plant, the leaves of which have been used for centuries by the millions of highland Indians of Peru and Bolivia, and to a lesser extent in Ecuador, Colombia, Chile, northern Argentina, and western Brazil. By far the bulk of the coca is consumed by the indigenous users, who chew the leaves not only because it gives them a euphoric feeling but because it helps them to escape from hunger and fatigue and their other personal miseries. So deeply ingrained is the habit that the educational campaigns conducted by several of the Andean governments have been completely ineffective.

Although an estimated 90 percent of the coca grown in Peru and Bolivia is consumed by the natives, it is believed that as much as 1,500 tons of coca leaves are converted into illicit cocaine.

The refinement of cocaine from coca leaves is reputed to be a relatively simple process—far simpler than the refinement of heroin. First of all, in numerous primitive refineries situated close to the coca fields, the dried leaves are converted into coca paste. In this procedure, it takes 100 kilograms of dried leaves to yield 2 kilograms of paste. Before it is shipped to the United States or other Western countries the paste is again refined into a fine white powder. The profits are enormous. A kilogram of cocaine in New York City would cost approximately \$20,000, and the street price in small quantities would come to many times this. But the coca leaves from which it was derived would bring the farmer only \$50, while the coca paste would sell for about \$250.

Cocaine is brought into the United States from Latin America primarily via Miami and the east coast, or via Mexico for the west coast market. It is smuggled in by ship, small planes, and by body-carriers by air travelers. According to a recent report from Santiago, Chile, three Peruvian nationals, including one woman, were arrested toward the end of September by the Chilean police for mailing some \$550,000 worth of cocaine into the United States. The cocaine was mailed in small plastic bags, each containing 10 grams, each bag sandwiched between two glued postcards.

The cocaine situation in the long run may prove even more difficult to control than the heroin situation. This is so because of the vast quantities which are produced for indigenous use in Latin American countries, because of the virtual impossibility of limiting production, because of the ease with which processed cocaine can be produced, and because the cocaine powder is, like heroin, an incredibly concentrated product that brings vast profits to the traffickers and that lends itself to easy concealment.

IS THERE A COMMUNIST INVOLVEMENT?

In my previous testimony I touched upon the question of possible Chinese Communist involvement in the drug traffic. I made the point that the world drug traffic is primarily a criminal phenomenon and that it would still be a serious problem even if we didn't have a single Communist country. And I also pointed out that the charge that China is producing 10,000 tons of opium a year is, on the surface, preposterous—since the entire world illicit consumption falls somewhere between 1,200 tons and 1,500 tons per year.

On the other hand, the evidence is clear that Communists in various parts of the world have been involved in the drug traffic in a variety of situations in which they felt it would serve their interests. In fact, I find it impossible to understand how our media can ignore the clear evidence of Communist involvement while exaggerating out of all proportion the charge that corruption among our Southeast Asian allies is the primary cause of the drug epidemic in our country.

The evidence taken by the subcommittee yesterday established that in one of the largest heroin smuggling cases on record, Manuel Dominguez Suarez, a onetime head of the Mexican Federal Judicial Police, made nine trips to East Berlin, each time returning to Mexico with 50 kilograms of heroin—which was then moved across the border into the United States. Since Mr. Suarez was able in each case to enter East Berlin without having his passport stamped, it is clear that elements of the East German Secret Police must have been involved.

The subcommittee also heard some startling facts about the Squella-Avendano case. Squella-Avendano, a prominent supporter of Chilean President Salvador Allende, was arrested in Miami on July 27, 1970, for transporting 203 pounds of Chilean cocaine, worth \$10 million. This was the largest cocaine seizure to date. Squella at his trial said that he had been slated to receive an important post in the Allende government. He was obviously a very important man to the Communist network in the Western Hemisphere, because hard on the heels of his arrest, the U.S. attorney in charge of the case was approached with the bizarre proposition that Squella be exchanged for four American hijackers then in Cuba. The offer was subsequently expanded to include the master of the *Johnny Express*, the Miami-based ship which was seized on the high seas last December by Castro's navy. Since then, there have been repeated articles in the pro-Communist press in Chile, hailing Squella as a national hero and as a victim of American imperialism. Let me quote from an article which appeared in the leftist paper *Ultima Hora*, Santiago, Chile on June 21, 1972:

Oscar Squella-Avendano, a former Air Force officer, the founder of military parachute training in Chile, is having a hard time. He is sick, suffering from recurrent asthma attacks, and is in an Atlanta, Georgia jail. The CIA has accused this friend of being involved in the drug traffic along with a group of deviates whom he cannot even identify on sight. Allende's enemies took electoral advantage of this sad incident, all to no avail. Squella's future is tragic. In his letter to Chilean friends, despite his serious illness and his unjust sentence, he demonstrates his great moral courage and his deep love for his country.


I have examined other evidence in the files of the subcommittee pointing to the conclusion that leftist elements in Latin America have been trafficking in drugs in the United States, and using the proceeds to support their guerrilla activities. I hope the subcommittee will find the time to go into this matter in depth.

In my previous testimony, I expressed the conviction that the heroin epidemic among the American Armed Forces in Vietnam was organized by Hanoi. I pointed out that in June of 1970, immediately after our Cambodian incursion, South Vietnam was flooded with heroin of remarkable purity—94 to 97 percent—which sold at the ridiculously low price of first \$1 and then \$2 a vial. If profit-motivated criminals were in charge of the operation, the price made no sense at all—because no GI who wanted to get high on heroin would have batted an

eyelash at paying \$5, or even \$10. The same amount of heroin in New York would have cost \$250. The only explanation that makes sense is that the epidemic was political rather than economic in inspiration—that whoever was behind the epidemic wanted to hook as many GI's as possible, as fast as possible, and as hard as possible.

I have prepared this special map of Southeast Asia, including Burma, because I wish to enlarge on my initial presentation.

Fact No. 1 that emerges from this map is that in Laos the Communists occupy some 80 to 90 percent of the opium growing areas. The diagonal lines indicate the areas under Communist occupation, and the broken dash boot-shaped line indicates the major opium producing area. Obviously, the Meo tribesmen who now produce their opium under Communist control aren't "eating" it all.



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Fact No. 2 which emerges from the map, is that the Communist-led guerrillas in Thailand are in effective control of an important stretch of opium producing land along the Lao frontier. The diagonal shading on the Thai side of the frontier indicates the area under Communist control.

In both Thailand and Laos, the villages where the opium is grown are controlled by Communist manager-cadres, many of them trained in Peking and Hanoi. Both movements are armed to a large degree with Chinese weapons, and both have their major radio propaganda operations based on Chinese territory. The money which they make from selling opium is used to support their respective insurgencies.

A highly interesting feature of the current political situation in Southeast Asia is the road, marked with a double line, which 25,000 Chinese Communists have been building across Northern Laos in the direction of the Thai frontier. Eight meters wide and hard-surfaced, the road is now only 40 miles away from that portion of the Thai frontier where pro-Peking guerrillas are already in control. The road is reported to be very heavily protected by radar and antiaircraft batteries.

Fact No. 3 which emerges from the map is that there is also an extensive opium poppy agriculture in North Vietnam. That this agriculture exist is a matter of common knowledge, and there has been some reference to it over the years in United Nations reports. We had the impression that there was a strange reluctance on the part of some of those we interviewed to discuss this situation. When our task force raised the matter, the reply we received was that so far as we know, the opium agriculture in North Vietnam is intended for licit medicinal purposes and that, while there has been a heavy consumption of opiates because of the hundreds of thousands of war wounded, we have no evidence that any of this production has been diverted for illicit purposes.

The Communist component also plays a vital role in the Burma drug situation. Burma, as I pointed out in my previous testimony, is the single most important factor in the Southeast Asia drug situation. This is where most of the opium is grown, it is where most of the refineries and traffickers are concentrated, and it is the ultimate source of most of the morphine base and heroin, as well as raw opium, that comes out of Southeast Asia. The Burmese Government is unhappy about the situation, but there are several major insurgencies in the area which prevent it from exercising any effective control.

Most of the opium in Burma is grown in the Shan State, which you see here. Some is also grown in the Kachin State to the north. Both the Shan tribesmen and the Kachin tribesmen have been in a state of insurgency against the Rangoon government ever since Burma became independent. But by far the most serious insurgency in the area is the White Flag Communist insurgency, which is under the immediate control of the Burmese Communist Party and of Peking. Here again, it is Peking which has armed the insurgents and trained their leaders, and which supports them with a China-based radio operation.

Over the past year, the White Flag Communist insurgency has grown to the point where it absorbs probably 80 percent of the total

counter insurgency energies of the Rangoon government in Northern Burma.

The Shan and the White Flag Communist insurgencies overlap each other. The area covered by the Shan insurgency is shown on this map by the light shading west of the Salween River. The White Flag Communists are in pretty solid control of the area east of the Salween River—between the Salween River and the Chinese frontier—marked in diagonal shading; and they are very active—to the point of exercising partial control—in the area west of the Salween River which is marked with heavy shading.

All of the armed groups in Burma, pro-Communist and anti-Communist, have been involved in the drug trade. This goes for the Shan and the Kachin insurgents: for the anti-Communist KKY or Burmese Self-Defense Force, and for the CIF, or Chinese Irregular Forces; and for both the White Flag Communist and the Red Flag Communists—a smaller group which is supposed to be under Trotskyist influence. Opium is the nearest thing these groups possess to gold—and they have all used it without compunction to purchase arms and support their activities.

The situation has been marked by a strange division of labor and by some highly enterprising, if unprincipled, accommodations between the rival factions. The KKY and the CIF are the dominant forces in the Thai-Laotian border area. Both of these forces have been heavily involved in the transport and smuggling of opium, and the KKY has also been heavily involved in the refinery operation. On the other hand, most of the opium in Burma, as I have pointed out, is grown by Shan tribesmen, under the complete or partial control of the Shan States Army or of the Communists.

The shaded area which the Communists control east of the Salween River is reputed to be the most fertile opium producing territory in the whole of Burma and is credited with some 25 percent of Burma's total production. Burma's production is estimated at some 400 tons a year, but the tribesmen use most of it for themselves, exporting only some 100 to 150 tons. Because it produces the largest surplus of any area in Burma, the territory under Communist control may be responsible for as much as 35-40 percent of Burma's entire opium export. In addition, as the map indicates, the Communists are active in a large area on the West side of the Salween River, which is also in the heart of the opium-growing belt.

How does the opium get from the areas where it is grown to the Thailand-Laos border? Obviously, it has to change hands in order to do so. It has to get from the Shan insurgents and from the White Flag Communist Shans into the hands of their hated enemies, the KKY and the CIF. To permit the consummation of these mutually profitable transactions, clearly, hostilities must be temporarily suspended by both sides. The town of Lashio—shown here on the map—is the principal exchange point, where the producers deliver their opium and where the caravans form up to move the opium south to the tri-border area.

In view of the fact that Peking mothered the White Flag Communist movement and that it still controls them, it cannot escape moral responsibility for their role as prime producers in the Burma opium traffic. Moreover, the fact of this insurgency places the Burmese Gov-

ernment in the invidious position of being unable to enforce its own laws in the area, and of having to tolerate opium trafficking by the regional military forces which oppose the Communists.

No matter how you cut it, the Peking regime cannot escape moral responsibility for this situation. It is a situation which calls for some plain talk—all the more so because China has now been brought into the world community of nations.

Now let me come to the delicate but necessary matter of Communist China. This is a situation where one generally runs into either blanket accusations or blanket denials. I shall engage in neither. I shall, instead, simply recapitulate the known facts, because, as far as today's situation is concerned, they point only to a big question mark and to the need for some more plain talk.

Fact No. 1.—The official U.S. position today is that we have no evidence that opium or opiates are coming out of Red China into the world markets; however, the possibility is not excluded that certain tribal elements in the China-Burma border area may be moving small quantities of opium across the border illicitly.

Fact No. 2.—It was conceded by everyone we spoke to that there is a substantial opium agriculture in China for medicinal purposes.

In the absence of any official information, all figures are, at best, "guesstimates." A recent official study on the world opium situation came up with an estimate of 100 tons of opium per annum, based on the assumption that China uses approximately as much for medicinal purposes as does India. But India, like most non-Communist nations, uses synthetic analgesics for the control of severe pain, whereas China, like all other Communist countries, uses opiates for analgesic purposes. That is why the Soviet Union uses 400 tons of opium a year while the United States uses only 200 tons. One official intelligence estimate about a year ago came up with the projection that China might be growing as much as 1,600 tons of opium per annum, based on the assumption that she uses as much, pro rata, for medicinal purposes as does the Soviet Union. This figure is probably on the high side. But most informed observers with whom we discussed the matter thought that Chinese licit production might well run to 800 or 1,000 tons a year.

Another big question mark enters into the estimate of aggregate Chinese production. The Peking regime, by draconian measures, was successful in putting an end to addiction in the cities. It is highly questionable that they have had the same degree of success in inducing China's many millions of hill people—most of them traditional opium smokers—to give up the habit. Even American officials who were disposed to downgrade the estimates of China's opium-growing capacity conceded that the Peking regime exercised only limited control over some of the more primitive hill tribes, and that it was conceivable that some of these hill people might be cultivating some opium and smuggling it south to the border. In view of the fact that Burma's hill people consume roughly two-thirds of the 400 tons they produce annually, and in view also of the fact that China's hill tribe population is probably 10 times as great as Burma's, the Peking regime would still have to be credited with a minor miracle if it has succeeded in reducing the annual opium consumption of its own hill people below the 500–1,000 ton mark. It might run much more. And wherever there is large

scale consumption, there is always—even without the connivance or intervention of the Government—a certain percentage of leakage.

Fact No. 3.—In Turkey the estimates are that diversions of opium from the licit market ran as high as 20 to 30 percent of the annual crops. Despite the stringent inspection and controls which govern the licit opium agriculture in India, Indian officials will privately concede that perhaps 10 percent of their total output escapes into the illicit market. It is probably that the percentage is close to the Indian mark in every country involved in licit opium agriculture. It may be smaller than this in China—but we have no way of knowing.

Fact No. 4.—There can be no question that large quantities of opium were coming out of China in the 1950's and early 1960's. The reports which the United States and the British Government filed with the U.N. made this charge year after year, supported by some very hard items of evidence. The report filed with the U.N. in 1962, for example, described an in-depth interview which a Senior American narcotics agent had had with three Yunnanese, one of whom had served as a muleskinner in a series of opium caravans moving from Yunnan into northern Burma.

The report of the U.N. Commission on Narcotic Drugs of May 14–June 1, 1962, summarized this evidence thus:

With reference to the question of the origin of opium in the Burma-Mainland China-Laos-Thailand border areas, information was reported by the Representative of the United States concerning investigations carried out in recent months in cooperation with control authorities in the Far East. Three witnesses, former inhabitants of Yunnan province in Mainland China, had made detailed statements to United States Treasury Department officials on the cultivation of opium in Yunnan and its export from there to the Shan States in Burma. One witness had himself been a cultivator, and in 1953 and 1956 he had also, with his mules, joined caravans transporting opium to the Shan frontier, where he assisted in its transshipment into trucks for transport to a trading company at Kentuag, Burma. Two caravans, of 108 and 82 mules, had transported over 4 and 3 tons respectively, two sealed tins of 20 kg. being carried by each mule. The cultivator estimated that some 6 tons of opium had been produced annually in the area where he lived, and that the total production of the region in 1961 had been of the order of 1,000 tons.

Fact No. 5.—The director of British customs in Hong Kong also told us that they have no evidence that opiates are coming out of China. On the other hand, he informed us frankly that they were not looking for evidence—that, for political reasons, they do not search ships or cargo coming out of Mainland China. In relating this, I do not intend any criticism of the British administration—the British position in Hong Kong is so precarious that one cannot blame them for seeking to avoid any confrontation with Communist China.

An identical situation prevails in Portuguese Macao.

What this adds up to is that we have no way of knowing whether illicit opiates are coming out of China at these two critical points. The Peking Government may be scrupulously honest about the ships and cargoes that travel to and through Hong Kong and Macao. All of her ships' masters and crewmen may also be scrupulously honest. But because her attitude makes inspection impossible, we simply have no way of knowing.

China's ability to move contraband through Hong Kong and Macao—if she is disposed to do so—is further enhanced by the fact

that a large number of ships of Hong Kong registry are operated by companies known to be controlled by the Peking Government.

Inevitably, such a situation must arouse suspicion. If China wishes to allay world suspicion, it is not too much to ask that it drop its objection to having ships and cargoes originating in China subjected to search by British or Portuguese or other customs officials. Every civilized nation in the world recognizes that other nations must have the right to inspect ships and cargo sailing under their flag in order to protect themselves against traffic in contraband of various kinds. If China is to become a fully cooperating member of the community of nations, she must abandon the attitude which at this point assures her ships and cargoes of privileges not accorded to any other nation.

Fact No. 6.—I have already dealt with the fact that increasing numbers of Chinese seamen, many of them based in Hong Kong, are being apprehended in the United States and Britain with quantities of heroin. In the case of the Hong Kong seamen, virtually all of them are members of the Hong Kong Seamen's Union, which is completely controlled by pro-Peking Communists. I want to emphasize that there is no evidence that the union, as such, is involved in narcotics smuggling. But the large number of Hong Kong seamen involved in the traffic does raise some questions—especially in view of the fact that the Communist leaders are known to exercise tight ideological and organizational control over their members. With this tight control over its membership, the Communist leadership of the Hong Kong's Seamen's Union could accomplish a good deal to control drug trafficking by its members through a vigorous educational campaign, accompanied by tough disciplinary measures. To date, it is to be regretted, there has been no evidence of such a campaign.

Fact No. 7.—The People's Republic of China is not a signatory of the 1961 Single Convention on Drugs. It does not, therefore, report to the United Nations on its licit opium agriculture, nor does it accept inspection of any kind, nor, does it participate in any international drug control operations. All of these facts combine to raise some very big question marks.

It is my earnest hope that the Chinese Government can be persuaded to add its signature to the 1961 single convention, as amended, and contribute its considerable strength and influence to the war on the international drug traffickers. This, obviously, should be a prime objective of our diplomacy. If China does so, it will help to dissipate the suspicion engendered by the present lack of information and absence of cooperation. No matter what their differences with Peking may be, the nations of the world would be united in hailing such an initiative by the Chinese Government. As far as the old charges and the old suspicions about mainland opium are concerned, I, for one, would be willing to close the book on the past in the interest of the future.

Mr. Chairman, with that overview given, I would like to deal with the role of the law and law enforcement and my recommendations in this area.

Senator THURMOND. What page?

General WALT. This is page 29 on the typed copy in front of you.

Senator THURMOND. Page 30?

General WALT. Page 29, sir. It is entitled "The Role of the Law."

THE ROLE OF THE LAW

In my opening remarks I made the statement that in countries where the laws are strong and law enforcement rigorous, there is no serious drug problem. Laws and law enforcement have roles of critical importance to play in limiting the availability of drugs—and limiting their availability is more than half the battle.

In the course of our travels around the world, my associates and I arrived at a simple manner of classifying countries on the issue of drugs: They were either “strong” countries, or “weak” countries, or “intermediate” countries, depending on how effectively their laws and their law enforcement authorities were able to deal with the traffickers.

The United States we classified as an intermediate country. We have laws on our books which, in theory, appear reasonably strong. But the enforcement of these laws is handicapped by numerous judicial restraints, which frequently make it possible for the traffickers to escape punishment, or else to get off with some ridiculously low sentence.

In announcing his war on the drug traffickers, President Nixon took the stand that trafficking is a crime far worse than murder. With this statement, I am certain that 99 percent of the American people would agree. It is a crime so massive, a crime so heinous, a crime so damaging to so many people and so hurtful to society, that it belongs in a category all by itself. At its upper limits, it is genocide on a massive scale—committed not by a government but by an individual trafficker or group of traffickers. And I want to make clear that when I speak of genocide, I mean it in the most literal sense. A single trafficker like Louis Cirillo may have imported as much as 1,000 kilograms of heroin. That's enough for 50 million “fixes,” or injections, at street strength. And how many lives can be destroyed by 50 million injections of heroin?

I am not a lawyer. I speak as a layman. But if we are prepared to accept such a definition of trafficking—if we are prepared to agree that it is a crime of a magnitude which imperils the Nation—then, from a simple commonsense standpoint, it seems to me that exceptional measures to deal with trafficking should be morally and legally justifiable.

Before I go on to make a few specific recommendations, I want to compare the implementation of the drug laws in some of the “strong” countries we visited with the implementation of the drug laws in our own country, and in some of the “weak” countries.

It may be some consolation that we have better laws and we do a better job of enforcing them than countries like Germany and Italy and Afghanistan and Hong Kong. But it's very poor consolation—especially when you look at the record.

I would like to show you two charts dealing with the handling of narcotics offenders in New York City from January 1, 1969, through October 31, 1971. These charts deal with class “A” felonies, involving more than 16 ounces of heroin—16 ounces of heroin, I want to point out again, has a street value in New York of about \$170,000, and is enough for about 20,000 injections—probably 30,000 or more at the current reduced strength. So we are talking about felonies of a pretty big order.

Here is chart 1. From this chart you will see that more than 20 percent of those arrested had been arrested a minimum of 10 times previously; that over 50 percent had been arrested at least four times previously; and that almost 5.1 percent had been arrested over 18 times previously. Many of these previous arrests were also on narcotics charges.

The question naturally arises: How can people who have been arrested so many times previously still be at liberty?

The second chart may help to explain the first. This chart shows the sentences handed down in class "A" drug indictments. You will see here that 38.1 percent got off with less than 7 years, and 61.9 percent with less than 10 years. With parole and good behavior, most of those with sentences of less than 7 years, of course, will be out on the streets in 2 or 3 years or less.

TABLE 3A.—*Arrest histories of persons charged with class "A" (16 ounces) felony narcotic offenses*

[New York City—Jan. 1, 1969 through Oct. 31, 1971]

Number of times previously arrested:	Cumulative percentage
0 or more.....	100.0
2 or more.....	67.6
4 or more.....	50.7
6 or more.....	36.7
8 or more.....	27.9
10 or more.....	20.5
12 or more.....	11.1
14 or more.....	9.5
16 or more.....	5.8
18 or more.....	5.1
20 or more.....	2.2

TABLE 5-A.—CLASS "A" FELONY INDICTMENTS

Maximum sentence imposed	Cumulative number	Cumulative percent
0.....	3	7.1
Less than 4 years.....	12	28.6
Less than 7 years.....	16	38.1
Less than 10 years.....	26	61.9
Less than 13 years.....	29	69.0
Less than 16 years.....	33	78.5
Life or less.....	42	100.0

But this only tells part of the story.

Major traffickers about whose guilt there was absolutely no question have been acquitted on the basis of technicalities which would not be honored by any court in any other civilized country.

Many more have skipped bail, even when the bail has been set as high as \$50,000 and \$100,000. During the period January 1, 1971 to June 30, 1972, 48 indicted traffickers skipped bail of \$10,000 or more. In aggregate the total amount of bail jumped by these indicted traffickers came to \$1,190,000. Mr. Chairman, I have two tables on the matter of bail jumping which I would like to insert into the record at this point.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, may this data be received for the record?

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

(The data referred to follow.)

BOND JUMPERS (BONDS OF \$10,000 OR MORE), JANUARY 1, 1971 TO JUNE 30, 1972

Region 1: Two jumped, both U.S. citizens; one apprehended.

Region 2: Six jumped, four U.S. citizens, one Cuban, and one Colombian; none apprehended.

Region 3: None jumped.

NYJTF: Eight jumped, four U.S. citizens, two Cubans, and two Colombians; two apprehended.

Region 4: One jumped, U.S. citizen; one apprehended.

Region 5: Three jumped, three Cubans; two apprehended.

Region 6: One jumped, U.S. citizen; not apprehended.

Region 7: Seven jumped, seven U.S. citizens; two apprehended.

Region 8: None jumped.

Region 10: Four jumped, four U.S. citizens; three apprehended.

Region 11: Six jumped, five U.S. citizens, one Mexican; one apprehended.

Region 12: Three jumped, three U.S. citizens; none apprehended.

Region 13: One jumped, U.S. citizen; not apprehended.

Region 14: Six jumped, three U.S. citizens, three Mexicans; none apprehended.

Total amount of bonds jumped by region: Region 1, \$35,000; Region 2, \$135,000; Region 3, 0; NYJTF, \$110,000; Region 4, \$10,000; Region 5, \$190,000; Region 6, \$20,000; Region 7, \$150,000; Region 8, 0; Region 10, \$80,000; Region 11, \$225,000; Region 12, \$75,000; Region 13, \$10,000; Region 14, \$150,000.

BNDD FUGITIVES—NATIONAL LEVEL

The study consisted of a review of 145 cases and 91 BNDD fugitives charged with fleeing subsequent to the posting of bond.

1. Of the 91 fugitives:

Twenty-one (23%) were released on their own recognizance, of these: Two (10%) had case histories of involvement in narcotics or dangerous drugs above the 10,000 dosage unit level.

Ten (11%) were released under less than \$1000 bond; of these: One (10%) had a capability of dealing at above the 10,000 dosage unit level in heroin.

Twenty-five (27%) were released on bond of between \$1001 and \$5000; of these: Four (16%) had involvement in dangerous drugs above the 10,000 dosage unit level.

Fourteen (15%) were released on bond of between \$5001 and \$10,000; of these: Four (29%) had prior involvement with narcotics or dangerous drugs; one (7%) was involved in dangerous drugs above the 10,000 dosage unit level.

Eleven (12%) fugitives were released on bond of between \$10,000 and \$25,000; of these: Three (27%) were involved in narcotics or dangerous drugs above the 10,000 dosage unit level, one of which was for a dangerous drug violation.

Ten (11%) fugitives were released on bond of over \$25,000; of these: Two (20%) were involved in narcotics or dangerous drugs above the 10,000 dosage unit level.

General WALT. Among the smaller and intermediate offenders many have never been brought to trial; many have been released on their own recognizance or on nominal bond; many have been at liberty for 6 months or a year or longer before being brought to trial; and, when they finally are brought to trial, many have gotten off with suspended sentences or with sentences that bear no relationship at all to the gravity of their crime.

In a recent study, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs surveyed the disposition of 422 cases involving traffickers of drugs in quantities exceeding 1,000 dosage units. Twenty percent of these were freed on their personal recognizance and 77 percent obtained their freedom on less than \$10,000 bond. It was further found that 71 percent of the sample remained free from three months to over a year before going to jail. Among the kilogram dealers and over (a kilogram

represents 50,000 dosage units of heroin and has a street value in New York of almost \$300,000), 16 percent of the total were free for over a year; 25 percent were free from 6 months to a year; and another 25 percent from 3 months to 6 months.

There have been numerous examples of postarrest drug trafficking activity by indicted criminals. In one recent case, a defendant was arrested in the Midwestern United States in possession of nearly one ton of marijuana. His private plane, which had been used to transport the marijuana, was confiscated. He was released on bail the same day. Six months later, while awaiting trial on the first charge, he was re-arrested, this time for the possession of 6½ pounds of cocaine, which he had smuggled from Latin America by plane. According to BNDD, there have been instances where traffickers have been arrested as many as three times before being brought to trial on the original charge.

If you want to know why we are having so much trouble in combating the traffickers, these are some of the reasons.

Now, let me tell you about the situation in the "strong" countries we visited. When I say "strong," I mean only in terms of their drug laws and how they enforce them. While some of the "strong" countries are authoritarian, there are at least several which, in my opinion, are basically as democratic as the United States.

In virtually all of these countries, there is no bail for drug traffickers; prisoners are subject to a period of interrogation by the police before they are permitted access to lawyers; justice is swiftly administered; the sentences are frequently near the maximum permissible, especially for major traffickers; and there is no parole.

Three of the countries we visited—Taiwan, Thailand, and Iran—had death as the maximum penalty for traffickers. I know that the death penalty is a moot matter in our country today. But the Supreme Court has not abolished the death penalty. And, if I may express a purely personal point of view, if I were confined to retaining the death penalty for one crime and one crime only, that crime would be drug trafficking.

JAPAN

The remarkable success which Japan had in dealing with an amphetamine epidemic and a burgeoning heroin epidemic which developed in the late 1950's demonstrates that such problems can be overcome within the framework of a basically democratic society.

In the late 1950's, Japan became aroused to the fact that a serious drug problem had been permitted to develop during the postwar period. It was estimated at the height of the crisis that 500,000 Japanese were mainlining amphetamines and that some 40,000 to 50,000 had become heroin addicts. In 1960 over 2,000 cases came before the Japanese courts involving the illicit traffic in narcotics.

The Japanese Government began to move vigorously. It set up a "Ministers' Council for Narcotics Countermeasures" and an "Anti-narcotic drug headquarters," and two important amendments were added to the narcotics control law in 1963. The first amendment increased the maximum term of imprisonment for traffickers from 10 years to life imprisonment. The second amendment established a system of compulsory hospitalization, plus followup counseling, for drug addicts.

In 6 years time, Japan had virtually liquidated its heroin addiction problem. By 1969, the total number of addicts was down to 6,008—of whom 98 percent had been addicted to medicinal narcotics under medical treatment. The number of new heroin addicts reported each year fell from 1,731 in 1961 to 1,072 in 1963, to 10 in 1968, and three in 1969.

The stiffer penalties under the amended law unquestionably played a role in enabling the Japanese to liquidate their epidemic. More important was the rigorous manner in which they enforced the antinarcotics law and the remarkable—but controlled—latitude accorded to the Japanese police in developing their investigations.

Under Japanese law, an arrested person can be detained and interrogated for a minimum of 48 hours without attorney or bail. The police may then get a court order authorizing them to continue the interrogation for another 10 days. Finally, they may ask for another court order, giving them a second 10 days. So narcotics suspects may be detained and interrogated for a total of 22 days without access to a lawyer.

The CHAIRMAN. That is "hell" on the lawyers, is it not?

General WALT. Yes, sir. But, it certainly was effective in dealing with the traffickers in Japan.

BNDD agents who have sat in on some of these interrogations say that the Japanese police do not deny their prisoners sleep or otherwise brutalize them. They say that the interrogations are conducted in a civilized but highly sophisticated manner. As in all countries, many of the prisoners are not particularly forthcoming with information at the point where the interrogation begins. But by the time the Japanese police have completed their 22 days of interrogation, they have generally wrung the prisoners dry of all the information they possess concerning confederates, associates, and the narcotics traffic in general. And when it comes to combating the narcotics traffickers, obtaining this kind of information is at least 50 percent of the game of law enforcement.

This, in a nutshell, is why Japan has no heroin addiction problem, and why the traffickers stay away from Japan even though her high standard of living would make Japan a highly lucrative market.

FRANCE

French narcotic laws are tough, and they are toughly enforced. Producers or traffickers, under a law decreed on December 31, 1970, can get 10 to 20 years in prison, plus banishment for 2 to 5 years, plus loss of civil rights for up to 10 years. Sentences handed down over the past year in important cases have generally run from 12 to 18 years. There is no bail in drug offenses, nor is there any parole for those convicted.

Under French law, those apprehended can be interrogated by the police for 4 days without access to a lawyer. A stenographic record, or *procès verbal*, is made of this interrogation, which is turned over to the judge and later becomes part of the court record of the case. On the basis of the information contained in the *procès verbal*, the judge may then issue instructions for further investigations or further apprehensions. We were told that this mandatory interrogation is an enormously potent instrument in the hands of experienced law enforcement officers.

French courts also have an immense advantage because of the widespread and flexible use of *commissions rogatoires*, or letters rogatory, in the investigative process. This is a particularly potent weapon in the war against the international traffickers. Under this procedure, other governments whose laws have parallel provisions can send to the French authorities a list of names of French residents who they have reason to believe are involved in the drug traffic, together with a list of the questions to be addressed to the suspects. It makes no difference whether the suspects in question are in prison or at liberty, they are all automatically brought before the French courts and obliged to answer the questions posed and any other questions which the examining magistrate may wish to put to them. Conversely, the French authorities may address letters rogatory to the authorities of other governments which honor the procedure.

Under section 1782, title 28 of the United States Code, U.S. courts are required to honor requests from foreign courts for testimony and evidence, subject to the constitutional protections and legal privileges which apply in ordinary cases. But while the U.S. authorities have frequently responded to letters rogatory from French courts, or other courts, they cannot employ the letter rogatory procedure in seeking information from other countries because such evidence would be thrown out as rank hearsay under American law—even though it might comply with all the traditional commonsense criteria.

In France and in other countries the records of such examinations are admissible as evidence and have frequently served as the basis for the imprisonment of criminal suspects.

The effectiveness of the letters rogatory procedure was dramatically illustrated in the *Cirillo* case. In the wake of this case, the French authorities addressed letters rogatory to the American courts, seeking information about the involvement of a number of French nationals or residents. As a result of the statements, or *procès verbal*, resulting from the letters rogatory, the French authorities have already made 23 arrests, and there has been some indication that there may be more arrests in the offing.

Mr. Chairman, because I feel the letter rogatory procedure to be a priceless instrument in the war against the traffickers, I wish to submit for publication in the appendix to this record, a copy of a memorandum on the subject prepared by the Department of Justice.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, may this be received?

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

(The material referred to may be found in the appendix, p. 192.)

CANADA

General WALT. Over the past 2 years, in particular, Canada has begun to crack down hard on narcotics traffickers, and there may also be certain things in her experience from which we might learn.

Canadian law, like American law, is committed to the concept of reasonable search, and under ordinary circumstances searches are conducted on the basis of court orders. However, members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police narcotics squad carry with them at all times a document called a Writ of Assistance, a kind of blanket search warrant which they can use at their discretion when they feel that circumstances do not permit waiting for a court warrant. I am told that

they do not abuse their Writs of Assistance and that they seek to obtain a formal warrant in the great majority of their searches. But it does give them a flexibility which American law enforcement officers do not possess.

There is, of course, no fifth amendment for arrested criminals in Canada, and in drug cases bail is more frequently than not denied by the presiding judge.

Evidence is considered on its own merit by the Canadian courts, and the police do not have to prove that a seizure was legal or that other evidence was legally obtained. The court philosophy is that it is its duty to pass on the guilt or innocence of the accused in the light of all the evidence available.

Canada has a mandatory minimum of 7 years for drug traffickers, but sentences as high as 15 years or life are commonplace. In a recent case involving 2½ kilos of heroin, two of the defendants were sentenced to life imprisonment, one got 12 years, and one got 10 years. By way of contrast, Louis Cirillo, one of the largest traffickers of all time, who may have brought as much as 1,000 kilos of heroin into the United States, received a 25 year sentence—which means that he could be out on the streets in 12 years or less.

The CHAIRMAN. He could get out in a little over 8 years, could he not?

General WALT. Yes, he can.

Mr. Chairman, in my previous testimony concerning the general situation in some of the countries we visited I dealt with the matter of law enforcement in West Germany, Italy, Hong Kong, and Afghanistan. The quality of law enforcement in these several countries ranges from intermediate to abysmal. But in the interest of brevity I do not wish to repeat here things which I have already said in another context.

In providing summaries of the manner in which other countries deal with the problem, I have purposely selected Japan, France, and Canada because no one can object that these are dictatorial or undemocratic countries. Their form of democracy varies in certain important respects from our own. But, by every reasonable standard, these are free societies and advanced civilizations.

I humbly consider myself a patriot. However, I am not so narrow a patriot that I am prepared to believe that the American system of government and law is superior in every respect to the systems of other countries. If you were to ask me to grade the manner in which we handle drug traffickers against the manner in which they are handled by Japan, France, and Canada, I would have to say that I consider their approach the more civilized.

WHAT CAN BE DONE?

As a result of what I have learned since I embarked on this investigation, there are a number of specific recommendations I would like to make. The problem must be attacked simultaneously on many fronts, domestically and internationally.

1. *Toward an opium reconnaissance satellite capability under United Nations Control:* First of all, we have to try to dry up the sources through bilateral and international programs designed to discourage the production of cocaine, hashish, marihuana, and illicit

opium, and to make existing controls more effective in the case of opium produced for licit use.

As a first step in this direction, it is essential that the U.N. International Narcotics Control Board be armed with an accurate opium map of the world. To achieve this objective, I propose that we seek an international agreement to accept reconnaissance satellite photography of all opium-growing areas, by a specially equipped reconnaissance satellite, operating under the aegis of the International Narcotics Control Board.

The technology for such a photographic reconnaissance system is very close to operational capability. On July 23 of this year the Department of the Interior, under its EROS program, launched its first Earth Resources Technology Satellite—called ERTS-1—equipped with television cameras specially designed to differentiate between different types of vegetation. This system will enable agricultural researchers in any part of the world to identify and measure the size of different crops in their countries. According to Dr. William Fisher, the manager of the EROS program, ERTS-1, with its present camera system, can distinguish fields down to a 10-acre size. Mr. Fisher expressed the opinion to our task force that there would be no insuperable difficulty in refining the technology so that fields down to 1 acre or a half-acre in size could be identified.

Mr. Chairman, to give the members of the subcommittee a clearer idea of how the EROS system works, I would like to project on the screen a false infrared photograph of the Monterey Bay area in California, taken by ERTS-1 on July 25 of this year. In the upper right area you will see the farmlands of the San Joaquin and the Sacramento valleys. You will note that some fields are red, some are orange, some are light blue, some are dark blue, some are white, and so forth. This is how different crops are distinguished.

This next photograph shows a computerized printout based on the information gathered by ERTS-1. In the region shown in this printout, C stands for corn, S for soybeans, W for wheat, and O for oats.

So that the record will be complete on this point, I would like to submit for inclusion in the appendix a copy of an article taken from the New York Sunday Times of July 30, 1972, describing the operations of the first earth resources technology satellite. I call attention, in particular, to the fact that this satellite is completely operational, and that it will be snapping and radioing to the ground over 9,000 pictures a week for at least a year.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, may this be received?

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

(The material referred to may be found in the appendix, p. 194.)

General WALT. From the standpoint of international law, I do not see how any nation could plausibly argue against the operation of an opium reconnaissance satellite—especially in view of the fact that the Soviet Union and the United States have, in effect, recognized each other's right to gather military information by satellite reconnaissance systems.

It seems to me, however, that if we are to have an internationally recognized opium reconnaissance satellite, it will have to be operated under the auspices of the International Narcotics Control Board, rather than under any national auspices. In response to a question, Sir Harry

Greenfield, the director of the INCB, told one of my staff assistants on August 17 that he would be delighted to have such a satellite placed at his disposal, once the technology is developed. "What we want to do," said Sir Harry, "is to be able to ask questions. And, if we can do so on the basis of authentic information, it greatly strengthens our hand."

Needless to say, such a system, would also strengthen the hands of the many governments which have to deal with the problem of illicit opium production. It would be particularly useful to the Turkish Government, in helping to enforce the ban on opium agriculture which is now going into effect.

2. *The geographic identification of seized opium and morphine:* We can also reinforce world intelligence capabilities by using the technology developed by the United Nations Narcotics Laboratory in Geneva to plot the geographic origin of all opium seizures. The laboratory already has on hand quantities of opium samples from most of the opium producing areas of the world. The opium samples from each area have been combined with a series of chemicals, to yield a complex of spectrographic curves, which, I am told, is as characteristic as a fingerprint. Unfortunately, the laboratory has only one sample of Yunnan Province opium, which is not enough to establish a chemical mean against which other samples could be matched. It is to be hoped that the Government of the People's Republic of China will fill this gap by supplying samples to the laboratory, as the governments of other opium producing countries, including the Soviet Union, have done.

According to Dr. Olav J. Braenden, the Director of the U.N. Narcotics Laboratory, it would be most effective if several regional laboratories could be provided with samples and trained to perform the tests used in determining the geographic origin of opium seizures.

Dr. Braenden also expressed the belief that with further research it might be possible to develop techniques for determining the geographic origin of morphine base. He expressed doubt, however, about being able to determine the geographic origin of heroin because of the very small amount of residual impurities in the heroin being refined today.

If a current map could be kept showing the place of seizure by geographic location and the place of origin by color coded dots, it would tell us a lot about the flow of opium, and, when the technology is developed, of morphine base.

3. *International action in northeast Burma:* In seeking to dry up the sources of illicit opium, I consider it mandatory that we work for the effective international action to deal with the situation in northeast Burma. As I pointed out in my previous testimony, this area constitutes the heartland of the Southeast Asia drug problem. It is in this area that most of the opium is grown, and most of the refineries are located, and most of the traffickers concentrated. For years now the Burmese Government has been unable to assert its authority or enforce its law in this area because of a series of national and political insurgencies. And there is no reason to hope that the situation will improve significantly over the coming years.

Mr. Chairman, it is my personal conviction that the situation in northeast Burma calls for United Nations intervention to put an end to opium production and heroin refining and trafficking in the area. I

feel that a far stronger case can be made for such intervention, from the standpoint of the security of the world community, than could be made for U.N. intervention in The Congo. Obviously such intervention would have to be carried out with the compliance and support of the Burmese Government and of the other governments in the area, including the Chinese Government. I do not underestimate the diplomatic difficulties. But I think we ought to make an all-out effort in this direction.

Whether or not U.N. action in northeast Burma proves feasible, I believe that our new relationship with Peking makes it both necessary and proper that we publicly call the situation in northeast Burma to her attention and ask for her assistance in making law enforcement in the territory possible—in the first place, by calling off the White Flag Communist insurgency in the frontier area.

4. *Interpol and the International Exchange of Narcotics Intelligence*: In Paris we had a very interesting session with Jean Nepote, the Director of Interpol. Interpol of course, is not an operational body; but it maintains a massive and unique file on international criminal activities of all kinds, and it does function effectively as a communications hub through which the law enforcement authorities of one country can rapidly obtain information, either from the Interpol files or from the law enforcement authorities of other countries.

Mr. Nepote showed us through the file room where they keep 1,500,000 dossiers on individuals and some 300,000 files of other kinds. He also showed us through the communication center, where they have a score of communication devices of various kinds for transmittal of Morse code—which they use exclusively because of language differences—tied in with the countries of the non-Communist world. There are approximately a dozen operators on duty.

We were amazed to learn that this internationally famous establishment was being operated on a budget of approximately \$1 million a year, to which the United States contributed \$35,000 a year from 1965 to 1970, but only \$28,000 a year in 1970 and 1971. This has resulted in the United States being placed on the list of delinquent nations, together with countries like Laos. Mr. Nepote made no bones about the fact that he was finding it difficult to operate within his budget and desperately needs more funds.

Among its many services, Interpol distributes flyers on internationally wanted criminals to all of its member governments, and it publishes a monthly summary of drug trafficking arrests around the world. I have two samples of these which I would like to submit for the appendix.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, may these exhibits be received?

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

(The material referred to may be found in the appendix, pp. 196, 197.)

General WALT. I have heard the criticism made that the French influence is excessively strong in Interpol. Be that as it may, it remains the only existing organization capable of functioning as an international intelligence exchange center in the war against drugs. From the U.S. standpoint it can be a particularly useful vehicle in the case of countries with whom we have no bilateral agreements. If we would like to see more of an American influence in Interpol, I think step

No. 1 should be to increase our share of the budget to a realistic level so that Interpol can modernize its communications and filing facilities and expand its services to member nations.

Interpol could be a much more effective organization if its budget were increased to say \$2 million per annum. But to do this, we would have to take the initiative, and we would probably have to raise our own contribution to, say, 10 percent of the total budget. Or perhaps we should go one step further and give Interpol the same degree of support that we give the United Nations, that is, 25 percent. I am convinced it would be money well spent.

5. *Dogs and other technologies:* Then there is the problem of improving our interception capabilities at ports and airports and border crossings. Perhaps the most impressive new "technological" development in this area is the heroin-sniffing dog. It is relatively easy to train dogs to smell marihuana or hashish because of their strong, distinct odors. But heroin has so light an odor that only a small number of exceptionally sensitive dogs can be trained to detect it. At the moment, we have a small number of heroin-sniffing dogs in the United States and one in Saigon. Canada also has two dogs trained to detect heroin.

I, personally, have had considerable experience with the capability of dogs. Back in World War II we used them many times to patrol those deltas of Southwest Asia. I, personally, had my life saved one afternoon because I happened to have a dog with me when I was moving a battalion from the rest area up to the headquarters, and we thought there were no Japanese in the area. Suddenly these dogs alerted. We were going up the trail and the dogs alerted and woke us up, you might say. And we sent scouts out and found there were two machine guns waiting for us around the bend of that trail. If we had gone around, we would never have gotten out of it—if we had not had the dogs there. And then I asked for dogs in South Vietnam, and we used dogs very effectively in South Vietnam, especially to locate mines and booby traps. They were the best weapons we had against mines and booby traps in Vietnam. And now I find they are training dogs to use against drugs, and they are becoming more and more effective against drugs.

In Saigon they gave us a demonstration with their heroin-sniffing dog.

They lined up seven GI's for us and this dog worked these GI's over, and he started at their collar and he sniffed them up and back, clear down to their feet, one at a time, right down the line. He went all the way down and he came back to No. 6, and started working him over again, and finally he grabbed hold of the pants leg of the No. 6 man and tore it wide open and found a very small vial of heroin wrapped in the fold above the boot.

Two days before our demonstration the same dog was out at the airport there in Saigon, and the passengers had already been checked at the station, and they had been checked for all kinds of contraband they might have, and they were on their way to the airplane, just about ready to board. And this dog was out there just standing alongside the passengers. He was not searching every one of them, but as this one passenger came by, the dog leaped up and grabbed the man's pants at the waist and tore them right off of him. And it was discovered that this man had a belt, a wide belt, and he had secreted a

considerable amount of heroin inside of that belt, and that dog, just by sensing that man going by, did this. So, I think there is real promise in the dog capability.

I must say I was enormously impressed by the performance of our heroin-sniffing dog in Saigon.

Even more impressive was the performance which one of the two Canadian dogs—a Labrador retriever—put on for our BNDD agent in Montreal. Our agent was asked to conceal a small plastic bag of heroin anywhere in a large garage, housing some 100 cars. It took the dog about 45 minutes of methodical sniffing, and then it came to a mechanic's toolbox where the plastic bag had been hidden, and it went through its "discovery" ritual.

The Bureau of Customs embarked on a dog training program against narcotics smuggling in late 1970, but it was not until the middle of this year that they had a small corps of dogs trained to detect heroin and cocaine. The first successful interception of a hard narcotic by a drug-detecting dog took place in Los Angeles in May of this year, when one of the Bureau's canine corps sniffed out a 1-pound shipment of cocaine, that would have been worth \$100,000 on the street. It is my understanding that the Bureau now has over 60 dogs assigned to ports of entry around the country, and that 30 of these have been trained to detect heroin and cocaine. Since the program became operational, these dogs have been instrumental in detecting over 50 separate heroin, opium, and cocaine shipments. I am told that one dog and his handler can process 400 to 500 packages in 30 minutes—a job that would ordinarily take a custom mail examiner several days time. A dog can also inspect a vehicle in about 1 minute flat.

If some way could be found to train several hundred heroin-sniffing dogs on a crash basis, I believe that this measure alone would soon result in a dramatic reduction in conventional smuggling activities. Even the one dog on duty in Saigon was enough to panic most of those GI's who may have been thinking of taking some heroin home through Tonsonhutt Airport.

There are other sophisticated technologies in the works which will vastly increase our detection capabilities, but for reasons of security, I cannot describe them here.

Senator THURMOND. General Walt, could I interrupt you there?

General WALT. Yes, sir.

Senator THURMOND. How long does it take to train a dog?

General WALT. It takes a number of months before they are efficient, they tell me. I believe what we are doing, sir, we are getting dogs that are a year or a year and one-half old to start off. And my own personal opinion, as a result of my experience at the National Academy of Sciences last summer, where we were experimenting with dogs in finding boobytraps—it is my opinion if we could start training these dogs when they are pups, we would do much better. First of all, it takes a special type of dog, he has to have special capabilities. I used the illustration that every man could not be a good Indian scout. One man in a hundred is a good Indian scout.

Senator THURMOND. What kind of dogs are the best for this?

General WALT. Dobermans and German police.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the name of the second one?

General WALT. Pardon?

Senator THURMOND. The names of the dog, the Doberman——

General WALT. Doberman and German police; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And German police?

General WALT. Yes, sir.

Senator THURMOND. Well, do you have people who are able to train those dogs?

General WALT. Yes, sir. The Air Force does this all of the time. They train the ones the Marines used in Vietnam and the Army, too. Yes, sir. And the Army has a capability also to train them, I believe, now.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Chairman, I have another appointment. I have finished reading this statement by General Walt, and if you will excuse me I will run to the other appointment. I just want to commend General Walt for a magnificent report.

General WALT. Thank you, sir.

Senator THURMOND. I think you have focused on one of the big problems, not only of the United States but of the world. And I observe here that you have reached the conclusion that this is a world problem and we have got to approach it from that standpoint.

General WALT. Yes, sir.

Senator THURMOND. And I just hope that we will be able to get the Congress to see this. And I am wondering if you plan to make appearances before different groups or maybe whether the chairman plans to invite some groups of Senators to hear him talk on this subject. Maybe it would help if you had a slide presentation you could make to point this out, because the Senators are so busy now it is hard to get them for an hour.

General WALT. Yes, sir.

Senator THURMOND. But if you could prepare maybe a slide, or some charts and do it in about 20 or 30 minutes, if you point up the problem, and then point up what you recommend, and the urgency of it—I feel something must be done and I shall wholeheartedly be glad to work toward this end.

General WALT. Senator, I think another way we can get to Congress is if we start a campaign around the country to give the people information about the drug menace. I think the people are generally alert to the danger now, and I believe that if we give them some facts and information that they, themselves, would put pressure on their Congressmen and Senators to do something about it. I think it should be attacked from both ends.

Senator THURMOND. You may have to do that if you cannot get the Congress to act without it; that is true. And I still think the schools ought to do more—that is where you have the children.

General WALT. Yes, sir.

Senator THURMOND. And the other day I saw—it came over the TV and it was about the fifth or sixth grade and they said that at that age, even, that about three-fourths of the children were taking some kind of drug, and I was just amazed.

General WALT. Yes, sir.

Senator THURMOND. And it is a big problem but we must find a solution and I want to commend you for your outstanding leadership in this field.

General WALT. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed, General?

General WALT. Thank you.

6. *The coordination of our control machinery must be improved:* I have formed the strong impression that there is a need to improve the coordination between the various Government agencies concerned with narcotics control, with a view to eliminating friction and overlapping and providing a clear chain of command for our entire operation, domestic and international.

That there should be deficiencies is not surprising in view of the fact that much of the structure is new or relatively new.

On the domestic plane, the work of BNDD, DALE, and Customs frequently overlap each other. In some cases BNDD appears to be playing the antismuggling role historically reserved to the U.S. Customs. In other cases, Customs seems to be involved in internal detective operations that BNDD or DALE might consider their prerogatives. In still other instances, it is virtually impossible to tell whether the cases in question fall within the jurisdiction of BNDD or the jurisdiction of DALE—and which agency finally does take charge of a case is frequently a matter of accident.

There has been some first-rate collaboration between the various agencies. For example, the collaboration between BNDD and Customs in the *Suarez* case was absolutely outstanding. But there has also been a good deal of friction.

In part, the difficulties stem from differing interpretations of operational guidelines. BNDD, for example, has taken the stand in certain instances that existing guidelines give it a monopoly over contracts with national police authorities having to do with drug trafficking.

In Heidelberg, General Davidson told us that CID had a long-established relationship with the German police officials which had prevailed since the end of World War II, and he felt that it would make for less efficiency, rather than more efficiency, if all contacts with the German police relating to the drug traffic had to be channeled through BNDD. He had therefore resisted BNDD's demand that CID abandon the practice of direct contact with the German police and that it deal with them through BNDD.

In Mexico, there has been similar friction between BNDD and Customs. I don't know whether things have improved since I was there 2½ months ago. But Customs apparently felt that they had been there a long time before BNDD and that something would be lost in terms of efficiency and cooperation with the Mexican authorities if everything had to go through BNDD.

Asked to comment on these remarks, BNDD informed our task force that in Germany it insisted on handling cases with the German

police authorities only when these cases clearly involved international trafficking; while in Mexico, they said, the Mexican authorities themselves had asked that BNDD serve as the contact agency.

Whether all contacts with the national police authorities should be centralized through BNDD is a question on which there can be differing opinions. In part it should depend on the position taken by the host government. But—from these situations and from other situations which have come to my attention—I believe that much could be gained from a more tightly structured command setup.

Interservice rivalry is a natural and inescapable phenomena and, properly controlled, it can be highly beneficial. Conversely, it can be injurious or even dangerous if it is permitted to get out of hand.

We needed a Joint Chiefs of Staff to pull our Armed Forces together and put some kind of limit on interservice rivalry. While our narcotics control effort is a civilian operation and not a military operation, it is certainly no exaggeration to say that we are involved in a “war” on drugs—and the waging of any kind of war imperatively demands a unified command structure.

Perhaps it would make sense to set up a “joint antinarcotics control directorate,” with Customs, BNDD, DALE, and the State Department represented, and with the White House coordinator serving as an impartial chairman.


7. *The effective use of Customs and the Coast Guard:* In seeking to establish the strong points and the weaknesses of our drug control machinery, I have had many meetings with representatives of BNDD, Customs, DALE.

In terms of the job to be done, I believe that both BNDD and DALE are in urgent need of some additional manpower. I was surprised to learn, for example, that our BNDD representative in Bonn had to go without a secretary for several months after his appointment. I was even more surprised to learn in recent days that BNDD still does not have an agent in Hamburg, which is one of the busiest ports in Europe and through which a significant portion of the European drug traffic passes.¹

But of all the services involved in the war on drugs, I have come away convinced that the U.S. Customs Service is by far the most seriously undermanned and underutilized. Indeed, I do not think it an exaggeration to say that, relative to the growth of its workload, we have permitted the Customs Service to atrophy.

I show you here a chart in which the number of Customs employees is plotted against the growth in workload over the past years. What this chart indicates is that, while the Customs workload has increased by 150 to 400 percent, Customs personnel has increased by only 50 percent. It is my understanding that, with the workload still rising sharply, personnel strength will be leveling off at the present figure.

¹ Since this report was submitted a BNDD agent has been assigned to Hamburg.



Early in our history the first Congress of the United States established the Customs Service as the first civil arm of the Federal Government. In so doing, Congress created an organization specifically designed to deal with the crime of smuggling. Congress armed this service with an enforcement authority which stands apart from the reasonable search concepts of the fourth amendment. It vested in this

Service the broadest powers to search every person, every cargo, every item of baggage, and every conveyance crossing our borders or entering our ports.

Nor were these powers of search to stop at our borders. If Customs agents have reason to believe that a person or a vehicle is engaged in smuggling, they can follow them a thousand miles or more to their point of destination and then perform the search without warrant—so long as the person or vehicle has been kept under constant surveillance from the moment of arrival until the moment of search. The deferred search may even be a second search—this sometimes happens when the first search at point of entry is made deliberately cursory in order to find out whom the smuggler meets and where he goes.

These statutes and these powers remain unchanged to this day, and there can be no question but that they constitute one of the most potent enforcement weapons in the Federal arsenal.

I am also convinced that the interception capabilities of our Customs Service were badly hurt when the Government in 1967 took the Coast Guard service away from the Treasury Department and vested it in the Transportation Department.

So long as it was part of the Treasury Department, the Coast Guard possessed the same broad authority as the Customs.

It has been called to my attention that the United States Code, volume 14, section 89, says the following:

The officers of the Coast Guard . . . in enforcing any law of the United States shall: . . . (B) be deemed to be acting as agents of the particular executive department or independent establishment charged with the administration of the particular law. . .

Separation from the Treasury Department resulted in the loss of integration with the Customs Service. One of the results of this has been that the Bureau of Customs has had to establish a coastal intrusion system and acquire its own antismuggling fleet. It is my understanding that, because of budgetary limitations, Customs' coastal intrusion capabilities are far punier than they were when they had the Coast Guard at their call. Inevitably, this has handicapped their anti-narcotics effort.

I strongly recommend to the administration that it consider the advantages of reuniting the Coast Guard with the Customs Service, within the framework of the Treasury Department.

8. *Our laws must be strengthened:*

The CHAIRMAN. I agree with you about that.

General WALT. Mr. Chairman, I am not a lawyer, as I said at the outset, and I therefore hope it will not be considered presumptuous if, as a layman, I offer several thoughts on what can be done to strengthen our drug laws and our law enforcement machinery.

My first recommendation is that there should be no bail for traffickers guilty of felonies, involving, say, 1,000 dosage units or more of narcotics. I believe that we can make as solid a legal and moral case for denying bail to traffickers as we can for denying bail to homicidal maniacs.

My second recommendation is that we return to mandatory minimum sentences for all major offenders. I know that most of our judges are opposed to the concept of mandatory minimum sentences because they feel that it deprives them of the discretion which they ought to have

in disposing of the wide variety of cases that comes before them. But I have been impressed by the argument of law enforcement authorities that the existence of a mandatory minimum gives them a much more potent and a badly needed weapon in breaking down pushers and traffickers and persuading them to talk. I also respectfully submit that the existence of a mandatory minimum of, let us say, 7 years for major offenders, would still leave a judge with a very wide range of discretion, ranging all the way from the minimum to life imprisonment.

My third recommendation is that there should be no parole for convicted traffickers. A 10-year sentence should be a 10-year sentence, a 20-year sentence should be a 20-year sentence.

My fourth recommendation is that capital punishment should be added to the range of options open to the courts in imposing sentence on major traffickers. If it were to enact such legislation, Congress would simply be giving effect to the President's declaration that drug traffickers are worse than murderers. Such an action, too, would serve to impress on the international community the gravity with which we view the crime of trafficking.

Finally, there is the matter of the prompt administration of the law. It is a truism that justice meted out promptly is a far more effective deterrent than justice delayed for a year or two—or even delayed indefinitely. Everyone is unhappy about the state of our court calendars, and there is general agreement that it will take a massive effort over a period of years to put these calendars on a current basis. I do not think we can wait that long to deal with the drug problem.

On the initiative of Drug Abuse Law Enforcement (DALE), a division of the Department of Justice, a number of permanent grand juries have already been set up to deal specifically with drug cases. This is a move in the right direction. At least it gives us the power to return indictments against accused traffickers without undue delay. But there is still far too much delay in bringing drug cases to trial—and this delay inevitably plays into the hands of the traffickers.

The thought has occurred to me that the delay in administering justice to narcotics violators could be eliminated if we had a system of special courts and special judges and special prosecutors for drug offenders—not on a permanent basis, but set up on an emergency basis for a limited period of time. Such a system of special courts would have the by-product advantage of reducing the pressure on our court system and helping it to eliminate the obstructive legal backlog.

9. *Scientific research on drugs*: My ninth recommendation is that we devote somewhat more money than we are now devoting to basic research on drugs. There are many problems that can be resolved only by scientific research. We have to find out whether it is possible to develop the opium identification technique already available, so that morphine base—and perhaps even heroin—can be identified by geographic origin. We have to find out more about the effects of cannabis and other drugs on the human body. I was dismayed to discover that the U.N. Narcotics Laboratory, which is extremely well-equipped and is staffed by four top-ranking scientists and six assistants, has only \$10,000 a year in operational funds. And it was equally dismaying to discover that the BNDD Laboratory has to operate with a budget of several hundred thousand dollars a year and that most of its effort is expended on the ballistic identification of drug samples.

10. *Drug education program:* In the field of education, I believe that new and more credible approaches are clearly necessary because we are obviously not getting through effectively enough to our young people. I was greatly impressed by what I saw of the Army's drug education program in Vietnam. They used teams of ex-addicts, one black and one white, who could talk the language of the young GI's and who sought to stimulate dialog rather than to preach. Some of their techniques, I strongly feel, definitely point the way to an effective educational approach.

11. *Internal security of the United States:* Finally, Mr. Chairman, there are a few recommendations I would like to make bearing on the internal security of the United States.

My first recommendation has to do with passports. The drug epidemic among our young people has brought about an epidemic of lost passports. Some of them are genuinely lost or stolen, but there is good reason for believing that many of them are sold to purchase drugs. This is a definite threat to the internal security of the United States, because forged or remade passports are used only by drug traffickers and other criminal elements and by spies. I believe we ought to strive to develop a passport that is forgery-proof; that there should be a real investigation rather than a token investigation of every lost passport; and that those who lose their passports should be required to pay a fee of, let us say, \$50 to cover the cost of the investigation.

My second recommendation is that—in view of the prevalence of drug addiction—Government employees in sensitive positions be required to take urinalysis tests if there are any reasons for suspecting that they may be addicted. I believe the urinalysis techniques developed by the Armed Forces in Vietnam have a definite application to the civilian sector.

Finally, there is much material in the files of the subcommittee which points to the conclusion that leftist guerrillas in Latin America are trafficking in drugs, in addition to robbing banks, to support their activities.

This is a situation which calls for a vigorous investigation.

Mr. Chairman, I do not pretend to any finality in these recommendations. Something must be done—and there may be different ways of doing it. I hope that what I have said here today will assist your subcommittee and the full Judiciary Committee to develop legislation tailored to the urgency and magnitude of the problem.

In closing my remarks, Mr. Chairman, I want to express my gratitude and appreciation to the three aides who worked with me on this study of the world drug problem—Mr. David Martin, senior analyst of the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security, Mr. Alfonso Tarabochia, chief investigator of the subcommittee, and Mr. Wayne Gillies, a prominent Houston attorney, who gave up almost 2 months of his time for nominal remuneration.

Mr. Martin and Mr. Gillies accompanied me on my 15-nation round-the-world investigation. Mr. Gillies, traveling on his own, covered Hawaii and Okinawa, and spent some time gathering information in Tokyo before I arrived there. Mr. Martin, after our return, made a followup study trip that took him to London, Geneva, and Montreal. I really appreciate, particularly, the dedication Mr. David Martin has shown in working 16 to 18 hours a day in order to get this report

together. Without his assistance, of course, we could not have had this report today.

Mr. Tarabochia, who joined our task force in Mexico because of his knowledge of Spanish and Latin America, also extended our investigation with visits to Rome, Milan, Trieste, Munich, and Frankfurt. He also gave great assistance with this report.

I could not possibly have asked for more dedicated or effective associates.

I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the confidence you have shown in me in giving me this assignment, and for taking time from your busy schedule to hear my testimony. I also want to express my thanks to your general counsel, Mr. J. G. Sourwine, for all the assistance he has given me, and for the assistance given by his staff.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Well, General, you have done a magnificent job. I hope it will be of great benefit to the people of the United States. I think you have handled it in an extremely capable manner. I think your recommendations in the testimony here are outstanding and I want to thank you for the very fine and outstanding work that you have done.

General WALT. Thank you, sir. It has been a pleasure.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, do you have some questions you want to ask him?

Mr. SOURWINE. I just have one or two, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I have to go. That precedes the roll call.

Mr. SOURWINE. General Walt—

The CHAIRMAN. Now, the full statement will go in the record.

Mr. SOURWINE. Very good, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you anything else to put in the record?

General WALT. No, sir, I have not.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I want to thank you, General.

General WALT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOURWINE. General Walt, I want to ask your opinion of a statement made in a recent book by Mr. Alfred W. McCoy called "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia," a book which has been receiving a great deal of publicity. One paragraph from this book spells out its theme, and I quote:

American diplomats and Secret Agents have been involved in the narcotics level traffic at three levels: (1) Coincidental complicity by allying with groups actively engaged in the drug traffic; (2) abetting the traffic by covering up for known heroin traffickers and condoning their involvement; (3) an active engagement in the transport of opium and heroin. It is ironic, to say the least, that America's heroin plague is of its own making.

And I stop the quotation at that point.

How about that statement, General Walt? Did you come across any evidence in the course of your investigations that the CIA and American diplomats are responsible for the heroin epidemic in this country?

General WALT. Well, sir, first of all let us put this in the proper perspective. The best authority say that less than 10 percent, probably 5 percent of the heroin that comes into the United States has come from Southeast Asia, so it is not affecting all of the addicts.

Second, in my discussions in Southeast Asia and in my investigation, I found no indication that the CIA was in any way conniving or in any way taking a part in or supporting or condoning the drug traffic

in Southeast Asia. Their only role is to report what intelligence they are able to gather to our Government.

I think there are several factors that must be considered in this matter of Southeast Asia. First of all, I do not believe Mr. McCoy gave the emphasis he should have given to the Burma problem. I think Burma is the heartland of the Golden Triangle and this is where your traffickers are and this is where your drugs are and your refineries are. I do not think he gave credit to the criminal element which also plays a major role in Southeast Asia trafficking. I do not think he paid enough attention to the lack of training and the lack of equipment capability of those young countries as far as preventing the traffic was concerned. I do not think he took a look at the Communist element, which I believe is important as far as the drug production in Southeast Asia and the transport from that area is concerned.

I think corruption probably plays a part, yes, but I would say it is the lesser of all these, and I would say that corruption now in those countries is on a pretty much reduced level, roughly corresponding to the type we have in this country.

Mr. SOURWINE. Thank you very, very much, General.

I have no other questions.

General WALT. Thank you, Mr. Sourwine. It has been a real pleasure working with you, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. For the information of those present, the committee hearing is scheduled to continue tomorrow morning at 10:30.

(Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m., the hearing was recessed to reconvene at 10:30 a.m. on Friday, September 15, 1972.)

APPENDIX

REPORT

ON THE ILLEGAL SMUGGLING OF, AND TRAFFICKING IN, NARCOTICS BY JORDANIAN NATIONALS IN THE OFFENBACH/FRANKFURT AREA

1. Since about the middle of 1960 narcotics trafficking in the Offenbach/Frankfurt area has been on the increase. Investigations revealed that Jordanian nationals residing in the Rhein/Main area, in particularly in Offenbach, are organizing and carrying out the smuggling of hashish on a large scale between Jordan, Lebanon and the FRG. In the course of time a ring of traffickers and pushers has been set up in the Rhein-Main area to an extent as has not hitherto been found in the FRG. Up to the present time approximately 100 individuals have been identified who are working for the ring either directly or indirectly.

According to investigations conducted thus far the ring works on behalf of the Al Fatah and the Palestinian Liberation Front. The majority of the Jordanian nationals, most all of them from the areas around Irbid and Ramtha/Jordan, who are living in the Rhein-Main area are members of these organizations. True, during recent times some members of the ring have gone into business of their own, but they still work together with the members of the ring.

Main figures in this ring of traffickers are the following Jordanian nationals:

1. *Share, Zaid Ahmad*, DOB: 6 Dec 1933, POB: Ramtha, Jordan; residing 4 Iselinstrasse, Frankfurt.
2. *Share, Abdel Shaffer*, DOB: 5 Jan 43, POB: Ramtha; residing 25 Ludwigstrasse, Offenbach.
3. *Share, Aghafer Zaidel*, DOB: 1943, POB: Ramtha; residing 25 Ludwigstrasse, Offenbach.
4. *Share, Mohamed*, DOB: 1939, POB: Ramtha; residing 25 Ludwigstrasse, Offenbach.
5. *Share, Abdel Aziz*, DOB: 30 May 44, POB: Ramtha.

They also use the name Khaled-Share and very frequently change their first names and/or nicknames so as to conceal their true identity. The degree of relationship between the Shares is not fully known as their statements in this respect are conflicting. They are reported to be brothers and cousins.

The names of the aforementioned individuals are referred to time and again in interrogations as well as communications/information from pushers and users.

MODUS OPERANDI

(a) Transportation by plane

The aforementioned individuals and/or intermediaries acting on their behalf hire persons who are interested in a flight to Beirut, Amman or Damascus. In the majority of cases the interested persons are advised already in Germany that they are supposed to pick up hashish at the airport of destination and smuggle it into the FRG. As they are interested in the good financial offer they do not refuse the smuggling.

The individuals concerned are then given an airline ticket as well as pocket money and are instructed that somebody will expect them at the airport of destination. Often a ring member will accompany them on their flight. At the place of destination—mostly Beirut—they are all provided with free accommodation at a hotel. After one, two or three days they are then taken to the airport where they are given one or two suitcases. Sometimes the suitcases are already on the plane and the couriers are then informed where they will have to take over the suitcases.

The return flight is often directly to Frankfurt, in recent times mostly via Rome, Geneva, Vienna, Zurich, Paris, Munich, Hamburg or Berlin-Schoenefeld (Berlin-East). At airports where stopovers are made the couriers must change planes, as the planes from the Middle East are subjected to more severe checks and in recent times several individuals were apprehended for smuggling hashish.

Sometimes the trip to Frankfurt/Offenbach is continued by train. The hashish is concealed in suitcases with false bottoms or in smugglers' vests. The suitcases are camouflaged by containing old clothes or other effects. Often the hand baggage of the couriers is picked up from the hotel and packed into the suitcases prior to the take-off in Beirut.

Upon arrival in the FRG the couriers are picked up at the airport or the train station, at which time they have to release the merchandise at once.

Sometimes the suitcases are also stashed away in a locker for one or two days.

(b) Transportation by motor vehicle

The members of the ring of traffickers in Jordan and Lebanon hire fellow countrymen there who are interested in a trip to Germany. The hashish is concealed in the automobile being used for the trip, sometimes without the knowledge of the operators. In Offenbach the car is then taken over and the hashish removed from it. In some cases the hashish is concealed among truck loads—mostly fruit transports. The trucks are not being checked en route as they are declared TIR vehicles.

(c) Transportation by boat

It was revealed that transportation is also effected by boat, to wit to Marseilles. There the shipment is being reloaded onto trucks and taken to the FRG. For the most part the hashish is being packed in cans and their contents shown as olive oil.

(d) Distribution of the merchandise

Investigation to date revealed that within one year several tons of hashish were smuggled into the Rhein-Main area and disposed of there.

Distribution is by means of intermediaries, recruited among hippies, beatniks, students etc. In recent times trafficking has been to an increased extent by pimps in Frankfurt, Offenbach, Hanau, Darmstadt and Wiesbaden. The pushing is then done by individuals who are dependent on the pimps or are being forced to make the sale. In many cases small pushers are being blackmailed by threatening them with complaints in the event they will not have disposed of the merchandise by a certain time.

In accordance with supply and demand the price asked per one kilogram fluctuates between DM 1,000.—and DM 2,000.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN LA DIRECTION GENERALE DE LA POLICE NATIONALE FRANCAISE (DIRECTION CENTRALE DE LA POLICE JUDICIAIRE) AND THE U.S. BUREAU OF NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS DRUGS FOR THE CO-ORDINATION OF PREVENTIVE AND REPRESSIVE ACTION AGAINST THE ILLICIT NARCOTIC AND DANGEROUS DRUG TRAFFIC¹

PREAMBLE

1. (a) The Office Central pour la Repression du Trafic Illicite des Stupéfiants of the Direction Centrale de la Police Judiciaire is the only French service entitled by Decree of August 3, 1953, to deal with its foreign counterparts in matters relating to narcotics and dangerous drugs. (b) On June 22, 1970, pursuant to a directive of the President of the United States, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs of the Department of Justice was given an identical competence.

2. The Direction Centrale de la Police Judiciaire (hereinafter call "Police Judiciaire") and the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (hereinafter called "Bureau") has always been the promoters of a close, sincere and effective collaboration between the various national police forces.

3. They are aware of the great responsibility placed on them as a result of the danger represented by the international traffic of narcotics and dangerous drugs.

4. The Police Judiciaire and the Bureau are greatly concerned by the considerable increase of this traffic and its evil consequences for the world's population.

5. Close cooperation and mutual assistance are, therefore, essential to enable the services to meet their respective obligations in combating the traffic of narcotics and dangerous drugs. This is inter alia, why the competent authorities of the two countries enter into the following agreement:

¹ Signed by le Ministre de L'Intérieur du Gouvernement de la République Française and the Attorney General of the United States of America.

AGREEMENT

Article 1

For purposes of this Agreement, the Bureau is the only service representing the Government of the United States in narcotic and dangerous drug law enforcement.

Article 2

The Police Judiciaire is the only service representing the Government of the French Republic in the same enforcement.

Article 3

Within the framework of their respective laws, the two services will exchange, at the earliest possible time, any information relative to their respective fields, particularly concerning investigations, arrests, seizures and illicit movements of drugs or suspects.

Article 4

In order to enable a quicker exchange of information, the two services will endeavor, within the framework of their respective competence, to conduct joint investigations on any matter of common interest, so that pertinent information may be placed as soon as possible at the disposal of each service.

Article 5

In order to achieve the goals set forth in this Agreement, representatives of the Bureau are stationed in France, and representatives of the Police Judiciaire are stationed in the United States. By prior mutual consent of the appropriate officials, the assignment of representatives in the respective countries may be changed as the illicit traffic may warrant.

Article 6

These appointments are for a duration of two years, starting September 1, 1970, and are renewable by tacit agreement.

Article 7

(a) The Bureau, in agreement with the Police Judiciaire, has stationed in Paris, France, a Regional Director and his Deputy. This enables the Direction Generale de la Police Nationale in France to have immediate and direct contact with the highest representative of the Bureau in Europe. The Regional Director of the Bureau will have direct and frequent contacts with the Office Central pour la Repression du Trafic Illicite des Stupéfiants for the purpose of ensuring coordination between the activities of the two services.

(b) On the basis of the present needs, the Bureau has assigned three representatives to Paris, France, and three representatives to Marseille, France. The Police Judiciaire accepts them insofar as they are the representatives of the Bureau. They are accredited to participate with their French colleagues in investigations of a common interest. In order that the organization of the Bureau in France be identical to the French police organization, which is highly centralized, the representatives stationed in Paris and Marseilles will be subordinate to the Regional Director of the Bureau or his delegate, in Paris. The Office Central will thus be able to deal with a single official responsible for the entire French territory.

(c) On the basis of the present needs, the Police Judiciaire has assigned two representatives to New York City in the United States. The Bureau accepts them insofar as they are the representatives of the Police Judiciaire. They are accredited to participate with their American colleagues in investigations of a common interest.

Article 8

The two services agree that special situations may justify the sending of representatives on a permanent or temporary mission to increase the existing manpower. In such cases, the service sending these representatives will obtain the prior agreement of the other service.

Article 9

The Police Judiciaire in France, and the Bureau in the United States, will ensure the full and total direction of all cases in their respective territories.

Article 10

The activity of the assigned representatives will be conducted in accordance with the laws and regulations in effect in the host country. The representatives will be informed of these laws and regulations, particularly as they pertain to the possession, carrying and use of weapons. They will act under all circumstances in such a manner as to avoid any attack on the reputation of the service with which they have been assigned to work.

Article 11

The activity of the representatives assigned will be coordinated with that of the specialized service for the repression of narcotic traffic in whose territorial jurisdiction these representatives will carry out their functions or special mission.

Article 12

The representatives assigned will not have authority to obligate the Government or service of the host country to any contract or legal liability except with the specific assent of a qualified representative of the Government or service concerned.

Article 13

Each of the services will assume the obligation, either directly or by insurance, for all damages to persons or properties resulting from the activity of its assigned representatives in the host country.

The administration of the country to which the foreign representatives are assigned will, therefore, be kept out of any proceedings or actions connected with any liability ensuing from the activity of the foreign representatives assigned to its territory.

Article 14

Each of the two services is bound to provide its assigned representatives the statutory guarantees in force in their respective countries regarding health benefits, accidents and temporary or total disability. In this connection, they will not be considered as civil servants of the Government to whose territory they are assigned.

Article 15

Each of the two services will bear the travel expenses of its respective representatives traveling between the two countries mentioned in this Agreement.

Article 16

The Bureau will bear the travel expenses of French representatives traveling in the United States, should these travels be made upon request from the Bureau, in connection with joint cases.

Article 17

The Police Judiciaire will bear the travel expenses of its representatives traveling in the United States, should it order these travels in the primary interest of the Police Judiciaire.

Article 18

Each of the two services will ensure payment of salaries and indemnities to their representatives on the basis of the regulations in force.

Article 19

Each of the services will grant to the foreign representatives assigned to them all facilities necessary for the efficient performance of their missions.

Article 20

As the circumstances may warrant, the two services will place at each other's disposal sources of information that might aid in the initiation or development of narcotic and dangerous drug investigations or which might assist one or the other service in some way.

Article 21

Being aware of the importance for the Police Judiciaire of the quick and complete execution in the United States of Rogatory Commissions issued by the French judiciary authorities in the matter of narcotics, the Bureau has set up a program to fulfill this important obligation effectively and expeditiously.

Article 22

Recognizing the urgent needs of the Bureau, the Police Judiciaire will honor promptly all requests for judicial assistance submitted to them by that service.

Article 23

Technical assistance, such as, vehicles, communication equipment, etc. . . ., can be placed at the disposal of the other by one of the two services pursuant to determined needs of common investigations.

Article 24

Each service will provide to the representatives assigned to its territory materials used for the training of specialized personnel (such as films, slides, literature and documents) and will provide access to professional training lectures. Particular instructions as to the penal provisions of both countries regarding narcotics and dangerous drugs will be included in this training program.

Article 25

Any press release pertaining to common investigations will be drawn up and coordinated by designated representatives of the two services, the main concern being not to jeopardize the final outcome of the investigation.

Article 26

This Agreement is concluded for a period of five years and is renewable from one year to the next, by tacit agreement. In case of termination by either side six months' notice must be given.

Done in Paris (France), the Twenty Sixth day of February Ninety Seventy One.

Two copies have been made, one in French, one in American, both texts being equally binding.

LE MINISTRE DE L'INTERIEUR DU THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED
GOUVERNEMENT DE LA REPUBLIC STATES OF AMERICA,
FRANCAISE, JOHN MITCHELL.
RAYMOND MARCELLIN.

COURT SENTENCES IN HONG KONG NARCOTICS CASES

(Report prepared for Gen. Lewis W. Walt, Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security)

CASES INVOLVING AMERICANS (1971-72)

White, Timothy (US Army). Arrested 17 February 1971 for possession of 34 capsules (5.6 grams) of No. 4 heroin. Volunteered information leading to discovery of additional 11 capsules and one plastic phial of same grade heroin. Charged with two counts of possession for trafficking. Pleaded guilty. Sentenced to 9 months imprisonment for each charge, to run concurrently. Discharged on good behavior 23 August 1971.

Evans, John Vincent III. Arrested 26 April 1971 for possession of one pound No. 3 heroin. Convicted of possession for trafficking. Sentenced to 8 months imprisonment.

Givens, Alvin Floyd. Arrested 19 June 1971 for possession of 16 packets of heroin. Bail set at \$10,000; 25 June 1971 released to custody of mother on \$100 bond and required to leave Colony within 3 days. Subject was 19 years of age.

Jones, Rodney Allen.

Prudhont, Leslie A. Arrested 31 July 1971 for smoking cannabis. Immediately released upon bail; 9 August 1971 pleaded guilty. Fined \$400 and required to leave Colony.

Fagan, Ricard Edward. Arrested 21 August 1971 at Kai Tak airport upon arrival from Bangkok. Possession of approximately 1¾ lb. heroin. Charged with possession for trafficking 20 September 1971. Sentenced to 4 years imprisonment. Appealed sentence 29 October 1971. Appeal dismissed. Currently preparing appeal petition to Governor (normal procedure).

Hilton, Joseph Edward. Arrested 22 September 1971 at Kai Tak airport upon arrival from Bangkok for possession of 2½ lbs. opium and ¾ oz. of heroin. Pleaded guilty. Sentenced to 18 months suspended for three years. Voluntarily departed Colony 29 September 1971.

Dancik, Paul Roman, and Gilbert, Veronica Susan. Arrested together 27 December 1971 at Kai Tak upon arrival from Bangkok. Charged and tried separately. Gilbert: Charged and convicted January 5, 1972, for possession of 1.3 grams cannabis. Sentenced to three months imprisonment suspended for 2 years. "Deportation for Life" order served 28 January 1972. Dancik: Charged and convicted 6 January 1972 for possession for trafficking of 16 kilograms of cannabis resin and pipes for smoking it. Sentenced to 4 months imprisonment or \$10,000 fine. Released 7 January. Voluntarily departed Colony.

CASES INVOLVING CHINESE

(January-March 1972)

Police statistics released May 8, 1972, reveal the enormity of the problem in the local Chinese community. In the first three months of this year police arrested 3,539 people for drug offenses. Of these, 2,223 were charged with possession of dangerous drugs, 24 for drug-related paraphernalia, 16 for keeping divans, 1,254 for smoking dangerous drugs, and 12 for other drug offenses.

Of the 3,057 already tried and convicted, approximately one third (1,200) were fined and released; another third (1,047) were sent to jail for less than 6 months; 345 were given jail terms of 6 months to one year; 51 for one to two years, 8 for two to three years, and one each for three, five and five to ten. The rest, 404, were either cautioned and released, sent to a training center, or placed on probation.

A recent case, reported in the June 9, 1972 *Hong Kong Standard* illustrates the judicial attitude towards traffickers. The case involved two fishermen found guilty of trafficking in 743.853 kilograms of raw opium and 22.963 kilograms of morphine (total worth—\$6 million). Although the judge remarked at the close of the trial that "without people like them trafficking in drugs would be impossible". Their sentence was only six years imprisonment each.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS DRUGS, REGION No. 2

LETTERS ROGATORY

Letters Rogatory are a judicial tool used, almost exclusively, by countries whose Rules of Criminal a/o Civil Procedure are based on the "Code Napoleon" as opposed to our "Common-Law" concept. Most European Countries (France, Belgium, Germany, Switzerland etc.) operate under such rules and this is also true for many South American countries. Even Mexico has rules based on the "Code Napoleon".

One of the outstanding features of the Napoleonic Code is the combining, within one judicial entity, of the functions, performed separately under our system, by the United States Commissioner (now United States Magistrate) and the Grand Jury. The Grand Jury hold judicial investigatory powers which result in an indictment or a No True Bill; The U.S. Commissioner has the power to conduct hearings, order suspects held or released on bail and issue search or arrest warrants.

Under the "Napoleonic Code" these two functions are performed by one single Magistrate, with the title of "Examining Magistrate". This Magistrate is an appointed Civil Servant and performs his function almost independently, being accountable neither to the Prosecution nor the Court. His actions, however, can be reviewed by a specially designated commission of trial judges.

The Examining Magistrate has the duty to investigate crimes or suspected crimes and determine if indictments and prosecution are warranted. To perform this duty he is entrusted with almost limitless power: He can issue arrest warrants, search warrants, subpoenas, order suspects held for trial etc. . . .

The Examining Magistrate's jurisdiction is limited to the territory of the District Court to which he is assigned. However, he may delegate his authority, in connection with any case, to other Examining Magistrates or the Police. This delegation is accomplished through the issuance of a Letter Rogatory.

The authority delegated through the Letter Rogatory may be restricted to a specific task, i.e. locate and seize certain document. This delegation of authority may also be broad and general, i.e. conduct all investigations required, make all arrests, searches and seizures necessary to establish the truth; (Such a Letter Rogatory constitutes an almost bank arrest, search and seizure warrant).

When assigned to execute a Letter Rogatory, the Police Officer loses his identity as a Law Enforcement Agent and becomes a Magistrate, acting for and in the name of the Examining Magistrate. Because of the complex legal problems encountered when executing a Letter Rogatory, some European Police Departments have groups of Detectives assigned exclusively to the execution of Letters Rogatory. Other Police Departments (such as the Belgium National Criminal Police) will act, almost only, upon receipt of a Letter Rogatory.

To perform his duties, the Examining Magistrate can also delegate his authority to a foreign state, through the issuance of an International Letter Rogatory. Governments operating under the Napoleonic Code have detailed procedures relative to the execution of International Letters Rogatory.

Such detailed procedures have not been spelled out in the U.S. Code, however the execution of International Letters Rogatory is covered by Section 1782(a) Title 28, U.S. Code, which provides that "The district court of the district in which a person resides or is found may order him to give his testimony or statement or to produce a document or other thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal. The order may be made pursuant to a letter rogatory issued, or request made, by a foreign or international tribunal or upon the application of any interested person and may direct that the testimony or statement be given, or the document or other thing be produced, before a person appointed by the court. By virtue of his appointment, the person appointed has power to administer any necessary oath and take the testimony or statement. The order may prescribe the practice and procedure, which may be in whole or part the practice and procedure of the foreign country or the international tribunal, for taking the testimony or statement or producing the document or other thing produced, in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A person may not be compelled to give his testimony or statement or to produce a document or other thing in violation of any legally applicable privilege."

In addition Rule 19 of the District Court, Southern Judicial District of New York, provides that "A person desiring to take deposition of a witness who resides or may be found within the district, for use in a judicial proceeding pending in a foreign country, may apply ex parte to the court for an order designating a commissioner before whom such deposition may be taken. If a person has been appointed to take such deposition by the court in which the action is pending, the court shall designate that person Commissioner unless there be good cause for withholding such designation. If no such appointment has been made, the court, if requested, shall designate as Commissioner a person authorized to administer oaths by the laws of the United States or of the State of New York. The entry of such an order constitutes a sufficient authorization for the issuance by the clerk of subpoenas for the persons named or described therein. The Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts, so far as applicable, including the provision for punishment for contempt for disobedience of a subpoena, shall govern the taking of such deposition".

Based on these rules, it is apparent that—

(a) International Letters Rogatory are to be executed by Commissioners appointed for that limited purpose.

(b) The practice and procedure may be in whole or in part that of the foreign country.

(c) The privileges and protection provided by the U.S. Constitution must be respected.

(d) The appointed Commissioner has the authority to cause the issuance of subpoenas and administer oaths.

International Letters Rogatory pertaining to Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs are usually channelled to BNDD by the overseas Offices. A copy of such an International Letter Rogatory from France (with english translation) is attached as enclosure A.

When assigned an International Letter Rogatory the receiving Region should contact the U.S. Attorney, in whose area of jurisdiction the Letter Rogatory must be executed. The U.S. Attorney will prepare an order to be signed by a District Judge, appointing a Commissioner for the execution of the International Letter Rogatory (See enclosure B). The U.S. Attorney will also prepare an oath of office for the Commissioner (see enclosure C). The order appointing Commissioner, together with the oath of office and the original Letter Rogatory are the documents giving the Commissioner the legal authority to proceed with the execution of the International Letter Rogatory.

Because the Letter Rogatory imposes an investigative duty on the Commissioner and because there is a need for security, it has been found expedient to have a Special Agent from BNDD appointed as Commissioner. No District Judge has ever objected to this procedure, which is usually requested in writing by the U.S. Attorney (See enclosure D).

It has been established that the International Letter Rogatory must be executed in such a manner as to satisfy the requirements of the foreign jurisdiction and in accordance with the requirements of the U.S. Constitution. This task is facilitated by the fact that, in most International Letters Rogatory, the issuing authority will spell out its own requirements, for instance: "Advise a defendant in writing of a planned interrogation, at least 48 hours before that interrogation is to take place". Or "advise the defendant that his attorney may examine the file of the case prior to the interrogation".

A mandatory requirement for the execution of any International Letter Rogatory is that all actions, by the Commissioner, must be documented by affidavits or depositions. The submission of a mere report on the investigation conducted in connection with the execution of the Letter Rogatory, does not suffice. Such a report does not meet the requirements of the Judicial Authorities operating under the Code Napoleon. Likewise all statements received by the Commissioner must be reduced to writing, in the form of affidavits or depositions.

As an example, if the Commissioner receives a document from a third party, he will have to make this fact a matter of record by preparing an affidavit entitled, "Receipt of report dated February 16, 1969 from Special Agent Smart". In such an affidavit Special Agent Smart would state that he is surrendering the specific report and that this report accurately reflects his knowledge on the subject matter. Further, if the Commissioner were to check certain records, he would report the results of his check, in an affidavit entitled: Results of Police Department records check on John Doe—etc. . . .

The usefulness of International Letters Rogatory cannot be overestimated. To properly assess this usefulness it is necessary to recall that, contrary to U.S. laws, most European countries will not surrender their own nationals to a country requesting extradition. However the European courts, operating under the Napoleonic Code, assume jurisdiction over their nationals, regardless of the territory where the offense has been committed.

This means that French Nationals having committed a crime in the United States can be prosecuted in France for that crime, provided, of course, the crime is also a prosecutable offense under French laws. Provided further, that the evidence proving the crime is turned over to the French courts. This provision of the French law is particularly convenient if one considers that narcotic violations committed in the United States, by French Nationals (including conspiracies), are prosecutable in France and that the Letter Rogatory is the instrument to provide the French courts with the necessary evidence.

ANTHONY S. POILL,

Deputy Associate Regional Director, Division 70.

[From the New York Times, July 30, 1972]

SPACE: TAKING INVENTORY—OF ALL THE EARTH

Flying 570 miles above the ground, a one-ton package of cameras and electronic scanners is watching Earth—looking for diseased forests 1,000 miles from any settlement, measuring the world's wheat crop, detecting the spread of water pollution over entire oceans and monitoring dozens of other phenomena on a scale never before possible.

Launched last Sunday from the Vandenberg Air Force Base in California, the package is ERTS-1, the first Earth Resources Technology Satellite of a program that is expected someday to yield the first truly global inventory of the storehouses and life support systems of Spaceship Earth.

Aboard ERTS-1 are versions of devices developed long ago by the military for spying both from high altitude aircraft and from satellites. Now that knowhow is being used for civilian purposes.

There is a set of three special television cameras that take still pictures, registering not only what is visible to the naked eye but also wavelengths of light the eye cannot see. There is also a multispectral scanner sensitive to other wavelengths.

And there is an apparatus for gathering signals from some 150 small automated ground stations scattered around remote areas of North America. The battery-powered stations are measuring such things as rain and snowfall, stream flow, and air pollution. Every 12 hours they radio the data to ERTS, which collects and relays the information to scientists on the ground.

What makes ERTS special is what scientists sometimes call its God's-eye view. A patch of ground that takes 1,000 photographs to cover by airplane can be seen in a single ERTS picture. What's more, that patch will be seen again in exactly the same way once every 18 days because ERTS's orbit is designed to carry the spacecraft over the exact same points on the planet at the same time of day every 18 days.

Because ERTS is in a nearly polar orbit, the pictures and other data will include not just the small regions covered by aircraft but the entire planet with the exception of small areas near the poles.

One important use of such data is in estimating agricultural production. Nobody knows how much rice or wheat or oats are being grown in the world. It is hoped that ERTS can supply that information. Such data would allow for more rational planning for food needs.

For example, it is now possible to fly a scanner over a region, feed the electronic readings into a computer on the ground and have the computer print out a map showing where there is wheat and where there is rice.

This is possible because every species of plant reflects a characteristic combination of wavelengths of light that can be used to identify it. The human eye can read some of the wavelengths and, for example, differentiate between a field of daisies and a field of marigolds. Multispectral scanners, sensitive to light waves the eye can't see, can tell the difference between wheat and oats.

Some 300 scientists from 37 countries are planning studies of various aspects of the earth using ERTS data. A geologist in Alaska plans to map the movement of glaciers. A California biologist will see whether he can detect infestations of the pink bollworm in cotton. A geographer in New Hampshire intends to chart the growth of the northern third of the East Coast megalopolis.

An agricultural researcher in Argentina plans to identify and measure the size of crops in his country. A French oceanographer will study coastal sedimentation. A Korean geologist will study the geological structure of his peninsula. The Bangladesh planning commission will use the pictures to chart agriculture and forestry resources.

Many of the investigations are experimental. It is not known how well the pictures will reveal what is being sought. Future satellites of the same type are expected to incorporate improvements based on experience with ERTS-1.

Even so, after only one week in orbit, flight controllers are already saying the quality of the test pictures returned thus far is better than expected. On Monday, with testing complete, ERTS-1 will go into full speed operation, snapping and radioing to the ground over 9,000 pictures a week for at least a year.

Unlike previous space science programs where individual scientists had exclusive rights to the data, all ERTS pictures and digital information on tape will be available to anyone at a nominal cost.

Those wishing an ERTS picture of any part of the world can have it by writing the Department of the Interior's Earth Resources Observation Systems Data Center in Sioux Falls, South Dakota. The cost is \$1.25 for a black-and-white, 70 mm (2¾ inches) on a side. Blowups to 20 inches by 20 inches are \$3.50. Each picture covers an area on the ground 115 miles on a side.

SPECIMEN OF INTERPOL CIRCULARS

U L U K O Y L U

CONFIDENTIAL
Intended only for Police
and Judicial Authorities



First name : Süleyman
born on 10th March 1945 in Akyazi, TURKEY

OCCUPATION : Chauffeur

NATIONALITY : Turkish

IDENTITY HAS BEEN CHECKED AND IS CORRECT

DESCRIPTION : see photo, height 177cm, dark brown hair, dark brown eyes.

MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION :

He was implicated in the seizure of 93,500 g. of morphine base on 18/2/1972 in Munich (FEDERAL GERMANY).

Holder of Turkish passport n°TR-C-189233, issued on 21/1/1972 in Istanbul, TURKEY.

Wanted on arrest warrant n°VI 6s 768/72 issued on 22/2/1972 by the Munich (FEDERAL GERMANY) judicial authorities for violation of the drugs law.

EXTRADITION WILL BE REQUESTED IF ARRESTED IN EUROPE.

REASON FOR THIS CIRCULATION :

Done at the request of the GERMAN authorities in order to discover his whereabouts.
If found : 1) in Europe, please detain; 2) in any other countries, please observe his movements and activities. In either case, inform : Bundeskriminalamt, Thaeerstrasse 11, Postfach A, 6200 WIESBADEN I (INTERPOL WIESBADEN), and also the I.C.P.O.-INTERPOL, General Secretariat, 28 rue Armand-gaud, 92210 St.Cloud (INTERPOL PARIS).



O.I.P.C. PARIS
Juin 1972

n° du dossier 303/72
n° de contrôle A 8052

CONFIDENTIALIntended only for Police
and Judicial Authorities**MARWAN ABDUL****KARIM JUROF**Born in 1943 in JAFFA, Israel
son of ABDUL KARIM JUROFOCCUPATION : Engineer.-- NATIONALITY : Jordanian.-- IDENTITY HAS BEEN CHECKED AND IS CORRECT.--ALIASES : MARWAN Jurof - EL-JUROF Marwan Abdel-Karim, born on 17th May 1943 in JAFFA - MARWAN Abdul Kareem --DESCRIPTION : see photo and fingerprints.--
Height 173 cm, brown hair, hazel eyes.--PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS :

NEPAL, Kathmandu, 29/10/1971 : fined 51 rupees for drug traffic.--

MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION :FEDERAL GERMANY, Munich, 17/1/1968, recorded for suspected rape; also wanted at national level by the Munich Public Prosecutor for forcing someone to commit immoral acts.--
In September 1969, he was suspected of engaging in drug traffic between Iran and Federal Germany.--

INDIA, New Delhi, 30/1/1970, arrested for possessing 11.303 g. of cannabis hidden in a smuggler's vest and a false-bottomed suitcase (the drug was obtained in Pakistan and intended for the European countries).--


NEPAL, Kathmandu, 28/10/1971, arrested for possessing 6.000 g. of cannabis hidden in a smuggler's belt (the drug was obtained in Nepal and intended for Federal Germany).--

He holds Jordanian passports No. 609006, issued on 30/6/1955 in AMMAN, Jordan, and No. 16648 or 166494 issued on 24/6/1969 by the Jordanian Embassy in ISLAMABAD, Pakistan.--

Liable to engage in DRUG TRAFFIC.--

REASON FOR THIS CIRCULATION :

Criminal. Is liable to commit crime abroad. It would be advisable to keep a watch on him if in your country. If he commits an indictable offence, please inform the I.C.P.O.-Interpol, General Secretariat, 28 rue Armengaud, 92 SAINT CLOUD (INTERPOL PARIS).



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I.C.P.O. PARIS
May 1972File n° 658/71
Control n° A 8022

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